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Blackwater Rising: The Legal Issues
Raised by the Unprecedented
Privatization of U.S. Military Functions
ROBERT D. PELTZ *
The Army has used civilian contractors to provide supplies and services to its forces in the field since the Revolutionary War. These early contractors fed the cavalry’s
horses and transported supplies. Over the years, the role of
the civilian contractor has dramatically evolved. Following
the Vietnam War and the end of the draft, there has been an
ever-increasing privatization of functions previously performed by the military.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which began in response to the September 11 attacks and have only recently
started to come to a formal end, have significantly accelerated this process. As a result, by 2010 the number of contractors in these battle zones began to exceed the number of
U.S. troops.
This massive privatization of functions previously carried out by the military has also resulted in an actual redefinition of their roles. Private contractors now perform
many jobs that were formerly the responsibility of uniformed
personnel, including those in forward battlefield positions as
well as in active combat. This significant change in role has
been accompanied by a corresponding rise in deaths and injuries for contractor employees, so that they now surpass
those sustained by military personnel.
The redefinition of the civilians’ role in battle has raised
many new legal issues, for which there was very limited
prior relevant precedent. In the civil context, these issues
The Peltz Law Firm, P.A., Miami, Florida; B.A. 1973 Duke University;
J.D. 1976 University of Miami School of Law.
*
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include the applicability of the political question doctrine to
tort cases arising on the battlefield; contractor immunity under the Feres doctrine, the government contractor defense
and the so-called combatant activities exception; the application of the state secrets doctrine and the enforceability of
arbitration clauses in employment contracts. Legal questions also arise in the criminal sphere, such as the liability
of civilian employees for breaches of local laws as well as
the Military Code of Justice and the extra-territorial jurisdiction of U.S. courts to hear cases arising from alleged
criminal acts occurring in overseas war zones.
As a result, the federal courts have been left to struggle
with many new and complex questions raised by these
changed civilian roles, relationships and functions without
any significant framework for guidance. Consequently, some
cases have dragged on for over a decade, while others have
reached diametrically opposite results, which are often not
logically capable of reconciliation.
If there was ever an area of overwhelmingly unique federal interest, it is the subject of military contractors’ legal
liabilities and responsibilities in war zones. The present
patchwork quilt of remedies is neither adequate nor fair and
is totally lacking in the predictability, which the law should
provide to its citizens. Too often the families of civilian men
and women, who died while serving in the roles traditionally
performed by soldiers in war time, have been denied any effective remedy for their loved one’s sacrifices.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the Revolutionary War, the Army has used civilian contractors to supply and service its forces. 1 These early contractors fed
the cavalry’s horses and transported supplies. 2 Over the years, the
role of civilian contractors in American wars has dramatically
evolved. After the Vietnam War and draft ended, there has been an
ever-increasing privatization of functions that were previously performed by military personnel. 3
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which began in response to
the September 11 attacks and continue today, have significantly
U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND, AMC-P 715–18, AMC CONTRACTS
AND CONTRACTORS SUPPORTING MILITARY OPERATIONS, 1-1 (June 26, 2000).
1

Colonel Ronda G. Urey, Civilian Contractors on the Battlefield 8–13 (Mar.
18, 2005) (M.A. research paper, U.S. Army War College) (on file with U.S. Army
War College).
3
See Lisa L. Turner & Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51
A.F. L. REV. 1, 22 (2001) (“This began to change during the Vietnam war and
had continued exponentially since that time.”).
2
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accelerated this process. 4 Traditional military jobs from mess hall
cooks, to convoy drivers, to security personnel have been increasingly taken over by private contractors. 5 As a result, by 2010 the
number of contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq began exceeding the
number of U.S. troops. 6
This massive privatization of military functions has also resulted
in an actual re-definition of their roles. Private contractors now perform many functions that were formerly the responsibility of uniformed personnel, including those in forward battlefield positions as
well as in active combat. 7 This redefinition of the civilians’ role in
battle has raised many new legal issues, both civil and criminal, for
which there has often been a lack of established precedent. 8
Consequently, some of the cases arising out of the use of such
contractors have bounced around from court to court and have taken
over a decade to resolve. 9 Other cases have reached disparate and
irreconcilable outcomes. 10 As a result, the families of civilian men
and women, who died while serving in the roles traditionally performed by soldiers in war time, have too often been denied any effective remedy for their loved one’s sacrifices. 11
See In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 331 (4th Cir. 2014).
See Urey, supra note 2, at 3; see also MAJORITY STAFF OF THE HOUSE OF
REP. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV. REFORM, 110TH CONG., MEMORANDUM
ON ADDITIONAL INFO. FOR HEARING ON PRIV. SEC. CONTRACTORS, 1–2 (2007).
6
COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN,
TRANSFORMING WARTIME CONTRACTING, CONTROLLING COSTS, REDUCING
RISKS 18 (2011).
7
See Deborah C. Kidwell, Public War Private Fight? The United States and
Private Military Companies 3 (Combat Studies Institute Press, Paper No. 12,
2005), available at https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studiesinstitute/csi-books/kidwell.pdf.
8
See id. at 3–4.
9
See, e.g., U.S. v. Slatten, 395 F. Supp. 3d 52, 54, 73 (D.D.C. 2019) (analyzing how the case against a Blackwater employee who started a firefight that
injured or killed thirty-one Iraqi civilians lasted over a decade).
10
Compare Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 554 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding
that tort claims arising from attack on military convoy against military contractor
were not barred by political question doctrine), with Whitaker v. KBR, 444 F.
Supp. 2d 1277, 1281–82 (M.D. Ga. 2006) (holding that tort claims arising from
attack on military convoy were barred by political question doctrine).
11
See Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC v. Nordan, No. 2:06-CV-49-F, 2011
WL 237840, at *1, *5, *8 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 21, 2011) (the families of Blackwater
employees, who were brutally tortured and murdered on the job in Fallujah, were
4
5
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Putting aside for another day the wisdom of this level of privatization and lack of institutional control, 12 many legal questions remain now that we are at this point. These issues include the legal
liability of contractors for injuries to their employees, third persons,
and soldiers; the rules and regulations governing both contractors
and their employees; and the potential criminal liability of the civilian employees for both breaches of local laws as well as the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. 13
As observed by the Fourth Circuit, in one case that stretched on
for over ten years, “Courts—including this Court—have struggled
with how to treat these contractors under the current legal framework, which protects government actors but not private contractors
from lawsuits in some cases.” 14
Although formal American military involvement in ongoing
hostilities in Iraq is significantly less today, while U.S. troops left
Afghanistan in the summer of 2021, these legal issues remain important, since the continued use of contractors to support U.S. interests in hot spots around the world only continues to grow. 15
A.
The History of Military Contractors in the United States
During the Revolutionary War, early contractors played the limited role of feeding the cavalry’s horses and transporting supplies.16
denied any recovery because they could not pay the extensive arbitration fees
called for in the deceased’s employment contracts).
12
Many sources provide further discussion on the policy issues raised by the
increased reliance upon private contractors. See Lisa L. Turner & Lynn G. Norton,
Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51 A.F. L. REV. 1, 34–38 (2001); JEREMY
SCAHILL, BLACKWATER, THE RISE OF THE WORLD’S MOST POWERFUL
MERCENARY ARMY 61–63 (2008); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 993–95 (2005); Urey, supra note 2, at 8–13.
13
See Kidwell, supra note 7, at 51; Turner & Norton, supra note 3, at 33–34.
14
In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 331 (4th Cir. 2014).
15
See Gordon L. Campbell, Contractors on the Battlefield: The Ethics of Paying Civilians to Enter Harm’s Way and Requiring Soldiers to Depend upon Them,
Presentation to the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics (Jan. 27-28,
2000) available at http://isme.tamu.edu/JSCOPE00/Campbell00.html; see also
DoD Personnel, Workforce Reports & Publications, DMDC https://dwp.
dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports (last visited Oct. 7,
2021).
16
See Urey, supra note 2, at 1.
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By the time of the Civil War, sutlers who accompanied the troops
sold non-military merchandise to the Union soldiers. 17 In World
War II, civilians fulfilled a variety of non-combat roles both at home
and in combat theaters, including scientific, engineering, and construction duties. 18 The Korean War saw extensive use of civilians
performing stevedoring as well as road and rail maintenance functions. 19 In Vietnam, civilians were involved in construction, base
operations, transportation, supply, and technical support activities.20
During the first Gulf War, civilian contractors provided maintenance and support for high-tech equipment as well as more mundane
water, food, and construction services. 21
However, the role of contractors transformed dramatically
throughout both post 9/11 conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
massive privatization of traditional military functions not only increased the number of civilians involved in our country’s war efforts, but resulted in an actual re-definition of their roles: 22
“Private contractors now perform many functions
that were formerly the responsibility of uniformed
personnel disciplined under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ). Moreover, contractors currently deploy to more forward (battlefield) positions
than ever before, and a large number of contractors
work outside active theaters. Many [private military
contractors] participate in active combat. Logistician
Joe Fortner observes, “contractors are not replacing
force structure, they are becoming force structure.” 23

Campbell, supra note 15.
Wm. C. Peters, On Law, Wars and Mercenaries: The Case for CourtsMartial Jurisdiction Over Civilian Contractor Misconduct in Iraq, 2006 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 367, 382 (2006).
19
Campbell, supra note 15.
20
Id.
21
See id.; Peters, supra note 18, at 382; William Spyro Speros, Friend-of-aFriendly Fire: A Future Tort Issue of Contractors on the Battlefield, 35 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 297, 300–01 (2006).
22
See Campbell, supra note 15.
23
See Kidwell, supra note, 7 at 3; see also Turner & Norton, supra note 3, at
22–23.
17
18
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This change in role has also resulted in the proliferation of civilian contractors providing security functions. 24 As noted in one
House Oversight Committee Staff Report at the height of the wars:
Under direct contracts with the government and subcontracts with reconstruction firms, private security
contractors perform a wide range of security functions, including: site security for military bases, the
Green Zone, and critical infrastructure; cash
transport; weapons demolition; surveillance; the
guarding of key personnel, contractors, and civilian
dignitaries; armed escorts for supply convoys; intelligence gathering; psychological warfare; covert operations; and the training of Iraqi security forces. 25
In addition to Blackwater (subsequently renamed Xe and now
Academi), companies such as KBR, Halliburton, Aegis, DynCorp,
Erinys, and Triple Canopy have received a substantial portion of the
hundreds of billions of dollars in government funds, 26 spent on waging the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. 27 The use of private contractors
to provide security services has become pervasive and unsupervised.
A Staff Report from the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, during the midst of the post war reconstruction period, observed that the Administration did not even know how many
private security contractor employees were operating in Iraq; some
estimates ranged as high as 48,000 personnel from 181 security
firms, which is the equivalent of three U.S. Army divisions. 28
During the first Gulf War, one in thirty-six people deployed in
the war zone were private contractors. 29 By 2010, the number of
See MAJORITY STAFF OF THE HOUSE OF REP. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND
GOV. REFORM, supra note 5, at 1–3.
25
Id.
26
Jason Ukman, Ex-Blackwater Firm Gets Name Change, Again, Wash. Post
(Dec. 12, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/ex-blackwater-firm-gets-a-name-change-again/2011/12/12/gIQAXf4Yp
O_blog.html.
27
See HEIDI M. PETERS & SOFIA PLAGAKIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., DEP’T OF
DEF. CONTRACTOR AND TROOP LEVELS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: 2007-2018,
R44116 at 2 (2019).
28
Id. at 2.
29
Turner & Norton, supra note 3, at 7.
24
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contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq had swelled to over 260,000,
exceeding the number of U.S. troops. 30Although the Obama Administration began to significantly draw down military fighting forces
from both Iraq and Afghanistan, 31 many contractors have remained
as those wars have continued under the Trump and Biden Administrations. 32
According to the Department of Defense (“DOD”), at the end of
2017, the last year that U.S. troop levels were publicly reported,
there were 23,659 contractors working for the U.S. military in Iraq
and Afghanistan compared to just 11,100 soldiers. 33 The disparity
in relative numbers has grown even greater as the number of troops
being drawn down has continued as reflected by published news reports of further decreases in troop levels accompanied by corresponding increases in the number of contractors to replace them. 34
As a result of this ongoing process, over the past two decades
private contractors have become the United States’ largest war partner, 35 prompting Blackwater 36 author Jeremy Scahill to quip on The
Daily Show, “The coalition of the willing, has now become the coalition of the billing.” 37
Not surprisingly, this increase in the role played by private contractors has been accompanied by a corresponding rise in deaths and

30
COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, supra
note 3, at 18.
31
PETERS & PLAGAKIS, supra note 27, at 2.
32
See Deborah Avant, If The U.S. Withdraws From Afghanistan, Will Its Military Contractors Stay? That’s Not Clear, Wash. Post (Feb. 28, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/28/if-us-withdraws-afghanistan-will-its-military-contractors-stay-thats-not-clear/.
33
PETERS & PLAGAKIS, supra note 27, at 8.
34
See id at 3; Thomas Gibbons-Neff & Mujib Mashal, U.S. to Withdraw
About 7,000 Troops from Afghanistan, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/us/politics/afghanistan-troop-withdrawal.html (estimating 14,000 U.S. troops to be stationed in Afghanistan at the
time).
35
Urey, supra note 2, at 3–4.
36
See SCAHILL, supra note 12, at 67.
37
The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Comedy Cent. television broadcast Apr.
19, 2007).

2021]

BLACKWATER RISING

171

injuries to their personnel. 38 In 2009, contractor employee deaths in
Iraq surpassed those of the U.S. military for the first time. 39 This gap
has continued to widen during the ensuing troop drawdown. 40
However, the increase in injuries and deaths to contractor employees is not just a result of the drawdown of military troops. In
2011, during a “surge” of combat fighters, 418 American soldiers
died in Afghanistan. 41 During this same time period, 430 employees
of U.S. contractors were reported killed according to statistics made
available by government sources. 42 The increase in the number of
injuries and deaths to contractor employees is a direct consequence
of their changing roles and their assumption of higher risk functions
previously handled by military personnel. 43
B.

The Public’s Awareness of the Role of Military Contractors
Most Americans first became aware of the private civilian presence working with the military in Iraq as a result of the gruesome
ambush of four Blackwater security personnel, who escorted a convoy of food supplies in Fallujah on March 31, 2004. 44 Up until this
time, news on the Iraq war typically identified non-military personnel simply as civilian workers or contractors, leading most Americans to believe these individuals were unarmed engineers or truck
drivers. 45 The Blackwater security personnel, however, consisted of
two former Army Rangers, an ex-Navy Seal, and an Army Special
Ops graduate. 46
On that fateful day, the convoy became lost and drove through
the center of Fallujah. 47 While stopped in traffic, two unarmored vehicles occupied by the Blackwater security contractors were

See generally Rod Nordland, War’s Risks Shift to Contractors, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 12, 2012) https://archive.nytimes.com/query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage9C0DE7D91F31F931A25751C0A9649D8B63.html.
39
Id.
40
See id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
See PETERS & PLAGAKIS, supra note 27, at 1.
44
SCAHILL, supra note 12, at 66.
45
See id. at 66–67.
46
Id. at 152–54.
47
Id. at 156–58.
38
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ambushed by grenades and machine gun fire. 48 A mob of attackers
quickly surrounded the vehicles and pulled the one survivor out
through the window, stoning him to death.49 After dismembering all
their bodies and dragging them through the city, two were hung up
for hours on a bridge over the Euphrates River. 50 The grizzly scene
was then broadcast for the whole world to see. 51
The families of the four Blackwater employees subsequently
brought suit against their employer claiming negligence in their
training, weapons supply, intelligence support, and manning as well
as for fraud. 52 Among the specific allegations raised by the families
was the claim that Blackwater failed to provide the security personnel with armored vehicles, 53 while only supplying two men rather
than three for each vehicle so that they were missing critical tail
gunners. 54 The complaint also alleged that Blackwater neglected to
even provide the men with maps, while starting the convoys immediately upon their arrival in the country, rather than allowing them
the promised twenty-one-day advance period in order to reconnoiter
the area and become familiar with the convoy routes and potential
threats. 55 A Staff Report of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives, subsequently
found evidence to support their charges. 56
Nevertheless, the litigation brought by the families ended without any recovery. 57 The families were required to arbitrate their
claims based upon a provision in their decedents’ employment
Id. at 158.
Id.
50
Id. at 159.
51
See SCAHILL, supra note 12, at 166; Nordan v. Blackwater Sec. Consulting,
LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 801, 805 (E.D.N.C. 2005); see also Abdulrazzaq Al-Saiedi,
The Unwilling Witness, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/17/magazine/unwilling-witness-at-falluja.html.
52
Nordan, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 803.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
See Iraqi Reconstruction: Reliance on Private Military Contractors: Memorandum before the Comm. On Oversight and Gov. Reform , supra note 11, at 3–
4.
57
See Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC v. Nordan, No. 2:06-CV-49-F, 2011
WL 237840 at *4 (E.D.N.C. Jan 21, 2011).
48
49
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contracts, which called for the parties to split the costs of arbitration. 58 The arbitration was eventually dismissed due to the families’
failure to pay for their share of the costs of the arbitration, which
they contended they were unable to afford. 59 Subsequently, the dismissal was confirmed by a North Carolina federal district court. 60
Blackwater was back in the news several years later in another
highly publicized incident, which again demonstrated the shortcomings of existing U.S. law to adequately govern the changing role of
military contractors in modern warfare. 61 This time four of its contractors were involved in a Wild West type shoot out while guarding
a State Department motorcade on September 16, 2007. 62 The gun
battle took place in a predominantly Sunni neighborhood of West
Baghdad, in which fourteen Iraqi civilians were killed and another
seventeen wounded. 63
The incident prompted the Iraqi Interior Minister to revoke
Blackwater’s operating license, only to learn that his action had no
effect on the company’s legal ability to continue working in Iraq. 64
Despite repeated angry denunciations from then Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki accusing Blackwater of numerous incidents of
wrongdoing, ranging from the killing of innocent citizens to helping
political figures escape from jail, Blackwater continued to operate
in Iraq. 65
At the time, the legal ability of the United States to handle such
incidents was unclear as a result of which the criminal cases against
the four dragged on for eleven years with the American courts facing
numerous legal and jurisdictional hurdles. 66 Westlaw lists numerous
Id. at *2; see also infra Section II.E.
Id. at *3-4.
60
See Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC., 2011 WL 237840, at *11–12.
61
See United States v. Slatten, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 45, 53(D.D.C. 2019).
62
Id.
63
Slatten, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 53, 73.
64
Sabrina Tavernise, Iraq Ends Security Company’s License After 8 Deaths,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/17/world/middleeast/17cnd-iraq.html.
65
See Jim Michaels, Iraq Seeking to Ban Contractor After Civilians Shot,
USA TODAY, Sept. 18, 2007, at 9A; Leila Fadel et al., Iraq Wants U.S. Firm Out,
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 18, 2007, at 9A; John Daniszewski & Tarek El-Tablawy,
Maliki Assails U.S. Security Setup, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 24, 2007, at 16A.
66
See Slatten, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 79.
58
59
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opinions in these cases from the U.S. Supreme Court, D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals, and U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 67 prior to their final resolution in the summer of 2020 with the
sentencing of the four defendants and the denial of their last motions
for new trial. 68 Even then the cases were not finally closed until December of 2020, when the four contractors were pardoned by President Trump as part of a highly controversial batch of pre-Christmas
pardons on his way out of office. 69
There are several important reasons for the difficulties U.S.
courts have faced in resolving these issues. At the top of the list is
the lack of a workable comprehensive statutory framework for the
resolution of the multitude of civil claims, which have arisen from
the increased exposure of the employees of military contractors to
the hazards of wartime hostilities.70 As discussed in the next section,
much of the existing law was developed during World War II and
the Vietnam War, significantly different conflicts fought under
markedly different circumstances in which civilians played a dramatically smaller and more isolated role. 71 As a result, certain principles have developed in a historical context, which seem to make
little logical sense today.
Due to this lack of established relevant common law precedent,
coupled with the absence of any comprehensive Congressional treatment of these issues, the district courts have been left to struggle
with many new and complex questions raised by these changed civilian roles, relationships, and functions without much of a framework for guidance. 72 As a result, many cases have reached

See, e.g., Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC v. Nordan, 549 U.S. 1260
(2007); U.S. v. Slough, 641 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Est. of Abtan v. Blackwater Lodge and Training Center, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009).
68
See U.S. v. Slatten, No. 1:14-cr-107-RCL, 2020 WL 4530729 (D.D.C.
Aug. 6, 2020).
69
See Maggie Haberman & Michael Schmidt, Trump Pardons Two Russia
Inquiry Figures and Blackwater Guards, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/22/us/politics/trump-pardons.html.
70
Greta S. Milligan, The Defense Base Act: An Outdated Law and its Current
Implications, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407, 434 (2009).
71
Turner & Norton, supra note 3, at 3–4.
72
In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 331 (4th Cir. 2014).
67
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diametrically opposite results, which are oftentimes not logically capable of reconciliation. 73
Although formal American military involvement in the ongoing
hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan has wound down significantly
from its highwater point, the legal issues from the extensive use of
military contractors in these wars still exists today. U.S. military
personnel are presently deployed in over 150 countries throughout
the world, some of which involve active hostilities. 74
The patchwork quilt of existing remedies, which were often created in a much earlier time to address significantly different circumstances, has produced results that are too often neither adequate nor
fair and lacking in the predictability the law should provide to its
citizens. 75 Accordingly, as discussed in more detail in the Conclusion to this article, this is an area which clearly calls out for a comprehensive Congressional solution.76
I.

STATUTORY COMPENSATION SCHEMES

A.
Defense Base Act
Strange as it may seem, the main statutory source for determining the claims of contractors against their employers arising out of
the wars in Afghanistan, a landlocked mountainous country, and
Iraq, a virtually landlocked country with vast deserts, is the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (“LHWCA”). 77
It is hard to imagine better evidence of the inadequacies of existing
law to properly govern such claims.
In 1927, Congress promulgated the LHWCA to provide a system
of uniform federal compensation for injuries to non-seamen
See, e.g., Fisher v. Halliburton, 667 F.3d 602, 610 (5th Cir. 2012); Potts v.
Dyncorp Int’l, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1252 (M.D. Ala. 2006); Lessin v. Kellogg
Brown & Root, No. CIVA H-05-01853, 2006 WL 3940556, at *4 (S.D. Tex. June
12, 2006).
74
See DEP’T OF DEF., DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., NO. OF MIL. AND DOD
APPROPRIATED FUND (APF) CIVILIAN PERS. PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED DEC. 2020
(Feb. 5, 2021), https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforcereports.
75
See Fisher, 667 F.3d at 610.
76
See discussion infra Conclusion.
77
33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.
73
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maritime workers, who at the time were not entitled to recover under
state workers’ compensation systems. 78 As with land-based workers’ compensation systems, the LHWCA provides a limited schedule of benefits for covered injuries that do not require a showing of
fault in exchange for providing the employer with tort immunity: 79
[T]he statutory scheme represents a “legislated compromise between the interests of employees and the
concerns of employers.” In other words, “there is a
quid pro quo.” . . . “In return for the guarantee of
compensation, the employees surrender commonlaw remedies against their employers for work-related injuries,” while the employers gain “immunity
from employee tort suits.” 80
Prior to the United States formal entry into World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt supported Great Britain’s war effort by the
adoption of his Lend-Lease Program, 81 in which American arms
were traded to England in exchange for leases on various military
bases throughout the world. 82 In order to provide a compensation
system for American civilian employees working on these bases acquired from England, Congress enacted the Defense Base Act
(“DBA”), 83 which extended the provisions of the LHWCA to these
employees. 84
Following the United States formal entry into World War II,
American defense bases greatly proliferated throughout the world. 85
Initial makeshift arrangements with contractors to provide workers
compensation coverage on a voluntary basis proved to be unsuccessful. 86 Accordingly, in response to the resulting “uneconomic and
See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 217 (1917).
33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.
80
Brink v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 1120, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citations
omitted).
81
WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE GLORY AND THE DREAM: A NARRATIVE
HISTORY OF AMERICA 1932-1972, 278–83 (Little, Brown & Co. 1974).
82
Id.
83
42 U.S.C. §§ 1651–1654.
84
Republic Aviation Corp. v. Lowe, 69 F. Supp. 473, 474–75 (S.D.N.Y.
1946).
85
See S. Rep. No. 85-1886, at 3 (1958).
86
Id. at 4.
78
79
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discriminatory” treatment of overseas workers in World War II due
to the limited coverage of the DBA as originally enacted, Congress
expanded its application through the 1942 War Hazards Act to,
“provide statutory coverage for all employees of contractors engaged in work outside the United States wherever located . . . .” 87
The DBA was then amended again in 1958, expanding the definition of “public work” to include “service contracts” to remove the
limitation imposed by several earlier cases restricting its application
to construction projects of a fixed or permanent nature. 88 The
amendment also broadened coverage to include persons employed
overseas by “welfare and morale organizations”, such as the Red
Cross and USO, while also applying it to non-citizen employees. 89
Following additional amendments over the years, by the time of
the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Defense Base Act 90 had
extended coverage to claims arising from injury or death to employees engaged in any employment:
(1) at any military, air, or naval base acquired after
January 1, 1940, by the United States from any foreign government; or
(2) upon any lands occupied or used by the United
States for military or naval purposes in any Territory
or possession outside the continental United
States . . . or
(3) upon any public work in any Territory or possession outside the continental United States . . . under
the contract of a contractor . . . with the United
States . . . or
(4) under a contract entered into with the United
States or any executive department . . . or agency
thereof . . . or subcontract or subordinate contract
Ross v. DynCorp, 362 F. Supp. 2d 344, 355 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting S. Rep.
No. 85-1886, at 4 (1958)).
88
See Flying Tiger Lines, Inc. v. Landy, 370 F.2d 48, 48–49 (9th Cir. 1966)
(applying DBA to a contract between the Air Force and a private contractor to
transport military personnel from California to Vietnam).
89
Ross, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 355.
90
See 42 U.S.C. §1651(a).
87
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with respect to such contract, where such contract is
to be performed outside the continental United States
and at places not within the areas described in subparagraphs (1)-(3) of this subdivision, for the purpose of engaging in public work 91 . . . or
(5) under a contract approved and financed by the
United States or any executive department . . . or
agency thereof . . . or any subcontract or subordinate
contract with respect to such contract, where such
contract is to be performed outside the continental
United States, under the Mutual Security Act of 1954
. . . [or] any successor Act . . . . 92
In reliance upon its legislative history, courts have liberally construed the types of activities coming within the reach of the DBA,
and have thus continuously expanded its coverage in the years following its adoption. 93 As a result, cases have held it applicable to
injuries and deaths occurring on military bases in Puerto Rico due
to defective equipment, 94 aircrew providing aviation support services for the Colombian army’s drug eradication services under U.S.
contract, 95 test pilots crashing on take offs from Pacific Islands, 96
contractors killed by other drunken contractors in Iraq, 97 and even a
Pan Am employee killed in a motor scooter accident in the West
Indies. 98
91
The term “public work” under this statute, includes “operations under service contracts and projects in connection with the national defense or with war
activities . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1651(b)(1).
92
42 U.S.C. §1651(a). The Mutual Security Act of 1954, was repealed and
superseded by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Ross, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 353
(citing Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 642, 75 Stat. 424
(codified at U.S.C. § 2151 (1961))).
93
See, e.g., Ross, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 355.
94
See, e.g., Davila-Perez v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 202 F.3d 464, 465, 469
(1st Cir. 2000).
95
See, e.g., Ross, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 347, 357.
96
See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. Lowe, 69 F. Supp. 472, 473, 480
(S.D.N.Y. 1946).
97
See, e.g., Pope v. Palmer, No. 10-13285, 2011 WL 4502859, at *1, *8 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 28, 2011).
98
See O’Keeffe v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 338 F.2d 319, 320–21 (5th
Cir. 1964).
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Courts have not been so liberal, however, in extending the definition of an “employer” entitled to tort immunity under the Act. 99
While in a few instances the DBA has been applied to closely related
entities, such as a “divisional unit” of the plaintiff’s employer 100 or
a joint venture, 101 the mere affiliation between companies with separate corporate structures is not sufficient to confer tort immunity.102
Where the DBA is silent, courts look to the LHWCA to fill in
the blanks. 103 Therefore, since the DBA fails to define the scope of
“injury or death to any employee engaged in employment,” courts
have relied upon the definition of “injury” under the LHWCA,
which it defines as “accidental injury or death arising out of and in
the course of employment, and such occupational disease . . . and
includes an injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed
against an employee because of his employment.” 104
The benefits provided to injured military contractors and their
families, in the event of death by the LHWCA, are relatively modest
and a mere fraction of what they would be expected to receive in a
civil tort suit. Under the statutory schedule a covered individual will
receive 66 2/3% of their average weekly wage (“AWW”) for a specified number of weeks depending upon the nature of their injury. 105
For example, the loss of an arm equals 312 weeks of benefits, the
loss of a leg 288 weeks, and the loss of an eye 160 weeks. 106 Disfigurement, no matter how severe, is compensated by a total of $7,500,
but only if it is likely to handicap the employee in obtaining or maintaining employment. 107
Regardless of the employee’s actual wage, however, the AWW
for purposes of these calculation cannot exceed 200% of the
99

2015).

See, e.g., Brokaw v. Boeing Co., 137 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1101 (N.D. Ill.

See Ross, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 347 n.1.
See Haas v. 653 Leasing Co., 425 F. Supp. 1305, 1316 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(finding that a joint venture and its participants were the plaintiff’s employer for
purposes of the LHWCA).
102
See, e.g., Brokaw, 137 F. Supp. 3d at 1100–01.
103
See, e.g., Fisher v. Halliburton, 667 F.3d 602, 610–11 (5th Cir. 2012); Pope
v. Palmer, No. 10-13285, 2011 WL 4502859, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2011).
104
Fisher, 667 F.3d at 610–11.
105
See 33 U.S.C. § 908(a)–(c).
106
Id. § 908(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(5).
107
See id. § 908(c)(20).
100
101
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“national average weekly wage” as determined by the Secretary of
Labor. 108 The most recent average announced by the Department of
Labor for the 12-month period beginning October 1, 2021 is
$863.49, thereby making the maximum AWW under the Act
$1,726.98. 109
Clearly, the risks and types of injuries to which the typical longshoreman is exposed while working at a U.S. port are hardly similar
or analogous to those faced by contractors working on a battlefield.
The extreme nature of such risks also factors into the significantly
higher compensation military contractors are paid than the typical
longshoreman unloading cargo at a domestic port. 110 According to
testimony provided during various House oversight hearings, the average daily pay for a Blackwater employee in the war zone was $600
per day at the high point of the Iraqi War. 111 Other sources have
given estimates of between $500 to $1500 per day. 112
Therefore, utilizing the scheme established by the LHWCA to
compensate the injured military contractor, or his family in case of
death, not only fails to take into account the literal life-threatening
risks faced on a daily basis and the severe nature of many resulting
battlefield injuries, but also shortchanges them by utilizing an artificially low average weekly wage that often bears little resemblance
to their actual pay.
B.
Exclusivity of Remedy
The broad immunity provided by the DBA to military contractors is a product of both the Act itself and its adoption of the
33 U.S.C. § 906(b).
National Average Weekly Wages (NAWW), Minimum and Maximum Compensation Rates, and Annual October Increases (Section 10(f)), U.S. DEP’T LAB.,
http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/NAWWinfo.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2021).
110
See Janet Farley, The Benefits of Working Overseas as a Contractor,
CLEARANCE JOBS (Apr. 3, 2011), https://news.clearancejobs.com/2011/04/03/
the-benefits-of-working-overseas-as-a-contractor/.
111
See Walter Pincus, U.S. Pays Steep Price for Private Security in Iraq,
WASH. POST Oct. 1, 2007, at A17.
112
See, e.g., JENNIFER K. ELSEA & KENNON H. NAKAMURA, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., RL32419, PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: BACKGROUND,
LEGAL STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES 4 (2008); See also Farley, supra note 111.
(“It is not uncommon to find opportunities paying well over $100,000 in base pay
alone.”).
108
109
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provisions of the LHWCA. 113 The DBA expressly provides that the
liability of any covered employer or contractor “under this chapter
shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer . . . to his employees (and their dependents) . . . under the
workmen’s compensation laws of any State, Territory, or other jurisdiction . . . .” 114 Cases construing the DBA have given this provision its clear and obvious meaning and rejected arguments that the
injured employee or his survivors can opt out of the Act in favor of
more generous state workers compensation schemes. 115
Significantly more extensive immunity is provided by the
DBA’s express adoption of “the provisions of the [LHWCA] . . . in
respect to the injury or death of any employee engaged in any employment . . .” 116 as defined by the Act. 117 In this regard, the
LHWCA provides that:
[t]he liability of an employer prescribed in section
904 of this title shall be exclusive and in place of all
other liability of such employer to the employee, his
legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled
to recover damages from such employer at law or in
admiralty on account of such injury or death . . . . 118
This broad immunity provided under the LHWCA, which has
been construed to “destroy any tort liability of the employer,” 119 has
similarly been interpreted in cases under the DBA as pre-empting
See Brink v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 1120, 1124–25 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
42 U.S.C. § 1651(c) (emphasis added).
115
See, e.g., Ross v. DynCorp., 362 F. Supp. 2d 344, 352–53, 365 (D.D.C.
2005); Flying Tiger Lines, Inc. v. Landy, 370 F.2d 46, 52 (9th Cir. 1966)(holding
that the language of § 1651(c) ‘‘clearly reveals a Congressional preference for the
federal remedy[,]’’ and that allowing for election of remedies ‘‘would only interfere with the apparent policy of the Defense Base Act by affording a choice of
remedies which was not intended.’’).
116
42 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
117
See Pope v. Palmer, No. 10-13285, 2011 WL 4502859, at *4 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 28, 2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a)).
118
33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (emphasis added). This section goes on to limit such
immunity to employers which fail to secure compensation for the benefits set forth
in the Act. Id.
119
Robin v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.2d 554, 556 (5th Cir. 1977).
113
114
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all common law causes of action against the employer based upon
negligence, regardless of how they are framed. 120 This includes
claims based upon negligent supervision, negligence per se or the
performance of an ultrahazardous activity as well as causes of action
under both wrongful death and survivorship statutes. 121
In Nordan v. Blackwater Security Consulting, LLC, however,
which arose out of the brutal torture and killing of four Blackwater
security personnel by a mob in Fallujah early in the Iraq War, the
district court concluded that the DBA did not “completely” preempt
all state law claims. 122 As a result, it remanded the plaintiffs’ state
law claims for wrongful death and fraud back to the state court
where they had been originally filed for further handling. 123
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs’ victory was short lived as Blackwater subsequently successfully removed the case under the Federal
Arbitration Act; thereafter, obtaining an order compelling arbitration pursuant to the terms of the contractors’ employment
120
See, e.g., Ross v. DynCorp., 362 F. Supp. 2d Supp. 344, 352 (D.D.C. 2005)
(“[the LHWCA] necessarily displaces all derivative common-law causes of action
based on the injury or death of a covered employee caused by employer negligence, including wrongful death and survivorship actions.”); Flying Tiger v.
Landy, 370 F.2d 46, 52 (9th Cir. 1966) (“[42 U.S.C § 1651(c)] clearly reveals
Congressional preference for the federal remedy”); Sparks v. Wyeth Lab’ys, Inc.,
431 F. Supp. 411, 417 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (‘‘The Defense Bases Act . . . makes
the exclusive remedy of an employee of a covered government contractor against
that contractor a compensation remedy under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act . . . .”).
121
See Ross, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 351–52, 357–58; Brink v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 787
F.3d 1120, 1123, 1126–27 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Jones v. Halliburton Co., 791 F.
Supp. 2d 567, 579, 602 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (and cases cited therein).
122
Nordan v. Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 801, 805,
809 (E.D.N.C. 2005).
123
Id. at 803, 813–14. The plaintiffs’ complaint, which had been filed in state
court and then removed to federal court, had been carefully drafted in a manner
to avoid reference to federal law, so on its face it did not show the existence of a
federal question. See id. at 803, 806–07. Under the “well-pleaded complaint” rule,
the district court therefore concluded that it was without subject matter jurisdiction, unless the claims were “completely” preempted by federal law. Id. at 806.
Determining that such complete preemption did not exist, it remanded the case
back to state court. See id. at 809, 814. In In re Blackwater Security Consulting,
LLC., 460 F.3d 580, 580, 582 (4th Cir. 2006), the Fourth Circuit subsequently
dismissed the appeal filed by Blackwater on the basis of 28 U.S.C. §1447(d)’s
prohibition against the review of remand orders. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
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agreement. 124 The arbitration was subsequently dismissed for the
nonpayment of arbitration costs, resulting in an award in Blackwater’s favor. 125
A recognized exception to the DBA’s exclusive application exists, however, for those claims which fall outside of the penumbra
of the LHWCA. 126 Courts have generally applied this exception
where either (1) the claimed injuries did not meet the statutory definition of an injury or (2) the employee’s injuries did not arise out
of his or her employment. 127
Although the DBA applies to claims for the “injury or death of
any employee,” 128 the Act itself does not define “injury.” 129 As a
result, the courts have looked to the LHWCA for such a definition. 130
The term “injury” means accidental injury or death
arising out of and in the course of employment, and
such occupational disease or infection as arises naturally out of such employment or as naturally or unavoidably results from such accidental injury, and includes an injury caused by the willful act of a third
person directed against an employee because of his
employment. 131
Accordingly, the LHWCA (and by extension the DBA) does not
apply where the employer acted with the specific intent to injure the
employee. 132 This loophole is extremely narrow, however, because
Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC v. Nordan, No. 2:06-CV-49-F, 2011
WL237840, at *1–2 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 21, 2011).
125
Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC., 2011 WL 237840, at *5, *8; see discussion supra Introduction.
126
See, e.g., Jones, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 587–88 (and cases cited therein).
127
Id. at 588 (holding where the plaintiff’s claim was determined to have not
arisen out of her employment, it did not matter whether her injuries came within
the statutory definition, because it was not necessary for the plaintiff’s claim to
meet both exceptions).
128
42 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
129
E.g., Martin v. Halliburton, 808 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989 (S.D. Tex. 2011)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a)).
130
See id.
131
33 U.S.C. § 902(2).
132
See, e.g., Martin, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 992.
124
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to qualify, the employer must have had a specific intent to injure the
employee as claims based upon reckless misconduct are not sufficient. 133
Although several courts have concluded that claims based upon
the intentional infliction of emotional distress suffered by the employee are likewise barred in the absence of a specific intent to injure
the worker, 134 such claims have been permitted where the injury was
suffered by the survivor of a deceased employee. 135 Accordingly, in
Martin v. Halliburton, 136 the court upheld a daughter’s right to pursue such a claim based upon the employer’s alleged fraudulent misrepresentation to her of the circumstances surrounding her father’s
death, concluding “[p]laintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress flows from injury against her and not the ‘accidental’ injury [her father] sustained.” 137
The second group of exceptions applies to claims that do not
arise out of the plaintiff’s employment. For example, in Jones v.
Halliburton Co., the court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled
to sue her employer for negligence, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress as a result of a rape by other
co-employees. 138 Even though her injuries did not arise out of her
employment, the attack occurred at housing provided by the employer on the base where she worked in Iraq. 139
Similarly, in Brink v. Continental Insurance Company, the D.C.
Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of various negligence
claims brought in a class action, but held that individual plaintiffs

See, e.g., Fisher v. Halliburton, 667 F.3d 602, 617–18 (5th Cir. 2012);
Vance v. CHF Int’l, 914 F. Supp. 2d 669, 678 n.1 (D. Md. 2012); Martin, 808 F.
Supp. 2d at 992; Austin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 508 F. Supp. 313, 316 (D.
Me. 1981) (holding that claims based upon reckless exposure to asbestos were
pre-empted by the LHWCA).
134
See, e.g., Vance, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 682.
135
See Martin, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 993.
136
Id. at 993.
137
Id.
138
Jones v. Halliburton Co., 791 F. Supp. 2d 567, 584–88 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
139
Id.
133
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could assert claims based upon both common law assault and sexual
assault, since they would not arise under the LHWCA. 140
In a subsequent decision, Sickle v. Torres Advanced Enterprise
Solutions, LLC., the D.C. Circuit addressed this exception in more
detail. 141 In this case, an employee (Elliott) of a military defense
contractor providing base security services in Baghdad injured his
back while lifting sandbags. 142 He was treated by the base medic
(Sickle), another employee of the same contractor, who subsequently recommended that he return home for more comprehensive
medical diagnosis and treatment. 143 Both Elliott and Sickle had
signed employment contracts with their employer specifying a term
of employment and procedures for terminating the contracts. 144
After returning stateside, Elliott filed a compensation claim under the DBA, in response to which his employer denied the claim
and terminated him, notwithstanding the terms of his contract.145
Thereafter, Elliott received a copy of the medical report prepared by
Sickle documenting his injuries from work, which he used to obtain
benefits under the DBA. 146 According to Sickle, the employer began
to “‘threaten and intimidate’ him, insisting that he recant his support
for Elliott’s workers’ compensation claim.” 147 When he refused, he
was likewise fired. 148
Elliott and Sickle subsequently jointly filed suit against their employer, asserting claims based upon retaliatory discharge, breach of
contract, and conspiracy to commit tortious conduct with its insurer
against them. 149 After going through a lengthy preemption analysis,
the circuit court concluded that Elliott’s claims all arose out of his
employment, because they stemmed from his claim for benefits
Brink v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 1120, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The D.C.
Circuit, however, upheld the district court’s dismissal of the claims based upon
violation of RICO statutes. Id. at 1122.
141
Sickle v. Torres Advanced Enter. Sols., 884 F.3d 338, 348–50 (D.C. Cir.
2018).
142
Id. at 342.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 342–43.
146
Id. at 343.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
140
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under the DBA. 150 As a result, it held that Elliott’s tort claims were
barred. 151 Conversely, it held that Sickle’s claims were not barred,
since they did not arise out of his employment, but instead from Elliott’s claim for benefits. 152
In an even more recent case involving highly unusual claims, the
district court in U.S. ex rel. Fadlalla v. DynCorp International,
LLC., held that neither Brink nor Sickle barred civil claims brought
by a group of translators hired to assist U.S. military forces in the
Middle East by a contractor, who was alleged to have engaged in a
fraudulent scheme to employ them in violation of Kuwaiti criminal
law. 153 When the contractor subsequently attempted to fire its Kuwaiti partner, the local company blew the whistle on the scheme to
the authorities, who imprisoned the unwitting plaintiffs in inhumane
conditions. 154 The court distinguished Brink on the grounds that the
RICO conspiracy claims therein were based upon an attempt to
evade liability under the DBA, while the claims before it were based
upon a scheme to circumvent Kuwaiti law. 155
The DBA only applies to claims asserted by an employee against
the contractor which hired it. 156 Therefore, lawsuits by service members against contractors, 157 or by the employee of one contractor
against another, are not affected by the Act. 158

Id. at 348.
Id. at 350.
152
Id. at 349–50.
153
See United States ex rel. Fadlalla v. DynCorp Int’l, LLC, 402 F. Supp. 3d
162, 186 (D. Md. 2019).
154
Id. at 174–75.
155
See id. at 174, 200.
156
See Brink v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 1120, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
157
See, e.g., Lessin v. Kellogg Brown & Root, No. CIVA H-05-01853, 2006
WL 3940556, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2006) (analyzing a case in which a soldier
brought a negligence claim against private contractor rather than under the DBA).
158
See, e.g., Potts v. Dyncorp Int’l LLC, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1246–48
(M.D. Ala. 2006) (analyzing a case in which an employee of one contractor sued
another contractor under several theories, including negligence, but not under the
DBA).
150
151
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CIVIL SUITS

A.
Political Question Doctrine
Much of the litigation stemming from the Iraq and Afghanistan
wars has focused on the applicability of the political question doctrine, which arises from the separation of powers between the three
branches of government established by the U. S. Constitution.159
Under this doctrine, courts will refrain from deciding controversies,
which “revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the
confines of the Executive Branch.” 160 Or more simply stated, where
the “responsibility for resolving [a particular claim] belongs to the
legislative or executive branches rather than to the judiciary.” 161
Because the Constitution delegates authority over military affairs to Congress and the President as Commander in Chief, while
expressing no role for the judiciary, cases involving foreign policy
and military determinations are particularly susceptible to such
claims. 162 As a result, the prevailing attitude of the courts has been
that “[m]ost military decisions lie solely within the purview of the
executive branch.” 163
Nevertheless, in Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court held that determination of whether a case is nonjusticiable by virtue of presenting a political question cannot be resolved by simply a “semantical
cataloguing” of the nature of the controversy, but instead requires a
“discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and posture of [each]
particular case . . . .” 164
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962); see also Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803) (“Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this
court.”).
160
Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 2521326, at *2 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 30, 2006) (quoting Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478
U.S. 221, 230 (1986)).
161
In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 334 (4th Cir. 2014).
162
See, e.g., Doe I v. State of Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 111–12 (D.D.C. 2005)
(dismissing claims brought by Palestinian residents of the West Bank against Israel).
163
In re KBR, 744 F.3d at 334 (quoting Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root
Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 407 n.9 (4th Cir. 2011)).
164
369 U.S. at 217.
159
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Accordingly, courts hearing cases involving the activities of military contractors have recognized that “[t]he Constitution’s allocation of war powers to the President and Congress does not exclude
the courts from every dispute that can arguably be connected to
‘combat’” just as “it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.” 165
As a result, “[c]ontroversies stemming from war are not automatically deemed political questions merely because militaristic activities are within the province of the Executive.” 166 Accordingly,
“the claim of military necessity will not, without more, shield government operations from judicial review,” even when part of an authorized military operation. 167
To assist courts in performing the discriminating inquiry called
for in Baker, the Supreme Court has set forth six indicia of a political
question:
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
(2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or
(3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or
(4) the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or

Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2005) (internal
citations omitted). See also In re KBR, 744 F.3d at 334 (“[A]lthough cases involving military decision making often fall in the political question box, we cannot
categorize such a case as nonjusticiable without delving into the circumstances at
issue.”).
166
McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1320 (M.D.
Fla. 2006) aff’d, 502 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2007).
167
Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1992).
165
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(5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or
(6) the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question. 168
The Court in Baker went on to hold that “[u]nless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no
dismissal for non-justiciability on the ground of a political question’s presence.” 169
As explained by the Third Circuit in Harris v. Kellogg Brown &
Root Services, Inc., the application of the political question doctrine
is often more complex in litigation against military contractors than
in suits against the government itself. 170
Defense contractors do not have independent constitutional authority and are not coordinate branches of
government to which we owe deference. Consequently, complaints against them for conduct that occurs while they are providing services to the military
in a theater of war rarely, if ever, directly implicate a
political question. Nonetheless, these suits may present nonjusticiable issues because military decisions
that are textually committed to the executive sometimes lie just beneath the surface of the case. For example, a contractor’s apparently wrongful conduct
may be a direct result of an order from the military,
or a plaintiff’s contributory negligence may be directly tied to the wisdom of an earlier military decision. 171
In considering the applicability of the doctrine to cases against
military contractors, courts tend to focus on the first, second, and
McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1357–58 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962)); see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (“[t]hese tests are probably listed in descending order of both importance and certainty.”).
169
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (emphasis added).
170
Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 724 F.3d 458, 465 (3d Cir.
2013).
171
Id. (internal citation omitted).
168
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fourth Baker factors. 172 Due to the inherent ambiguity of these factors, the application of the political question doctrine has been very
uneven, and at times extremely inconsistent, prompting one circuit
court to observe that “[n]o branch of the law of justiciability is in
such disarray as the doctrine of ‘political question.’” 173 Accordingly, it is not surprising that courts have often applied it in seemingly contradictory fashion in contractor cases.
For example, in McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., which
involved the death of three servicemen in the crash of a small plane
operated by a subsidiary of Blackwater in Afghanistan, the district
court observed that the political question doctrine has been “applied
in very limited circumstances, but it has almost never been applied
to suits involving private defendants.” 174 Conversely, other courts
hearing suits against private contractors have concluded: “[g]iven
the unprecedented levels at which today’s military relies on contractors to support its mission, [] this Court has recognized that a military contractor acting under military orders can also invoke the political question doctrine as a shield under certain circumstances.”175
Even in cases against the government, the application of the political question doctrine has at times been inconsistent. In Koohi v.
United States, the Ninth Circuit rejected its application to a lawsuit
arising out of the erroneous downing of a civilian Iranian aircraft by
a U.S. battleship, which had mistaken it for a F-14 fighter jet during
a period of heightened hostilities adjunct to the Iran-Iraq War. 176 Yet
in Aktepe v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit applied the political
question doctrine to bar a suit by members of the Turkish Navy,
whose ship was accidentally hit by live Sparrow missiles fired by
the U.S.S. Saratoga during NATO simulated war games. 177

See In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 893 F.3d 241, 259 (4th Cir. 2018); see
also Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 408–09 (4th Cir.
2011).
173
Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859
F.2d 929, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 14, at 74 (4th ed. 1983)).
174
McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1318–19
(M.D. Fla. 2006), aff’d on other grounds, 502 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2007).
175
In re KBR, 893 F.3d at 259.
176
Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1330–32 (9th Cir. 1992).
177
Aktepe v. United States, 105 F.3d 1401, 1401–03 (11th Cir. 1997).
172
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Much of the difficulty in applying the doctrine arises from the
lack of definitive parameters and guidance afforded by the Baker
factors, particularly in the military context. 178 As a result, some
courts have taken an expansive view, concluding that “[m]atters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely
proper subjects for judicial intervention.” 179 Other courts, however,
have expressed the more restrictive posture that just because an action is “taken in the ordinary exercise of discretion in the conduct of
war” does not by itself remove the action from judicial review. 180
The wide discretion afforded by the Baker factors has, thus, allowed courts to utilize varying philosophical approaches in analyzing the applicability of the doctrine in specific cases. 181 For example, in McMahon, the district court adopted a very restrictive view
of its parameters in this context by noting that “[m]ilitary-related
cases that constitute political questions have been limited to ‘direct
challenges to the institutional functioning of the military in such areas as the relationship between personnel, discipline, and training . . . [or challenges] impact[ing] upon the internal functioning and
operation of the military.” 182
This rationale was largely followed by the Eleventh Circuit in
affirming the district court’s opinion. 183 After noting that decisions
such as “whether and under what circumstances to employ military
force” and “[t]he strategy and tactics employed on the battlefield”
are typically political questions, the court concluded that claims
against contractors are “at least one step removed” from such cases
filed against the government. 184Accordingly, the contractor will
“carry a double burden,” first being required to establish that “the
claims against it will require reexamination of a decision by the

WRIGHT, supra note 173, at 80.
Aktepe, 105 F.3d at 1403 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981)).
180
Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1332 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 715
(1900)).
181
WRIGHT, supra note 173, at 77.
182
McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1321 (quoting Nation Mag. v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 762 F. Supp 1558, 1567
(S.D.N.Y. 1991)), aff’d, 502 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2007).
183
See McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1366.
184
Id. at 1359.
178
179
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military” and then “it must demonstrate that the military decision at
issue . . . is insulated from judicial review.” 185
Courts adopting this more restrictive view of the political question doctrine have limited its application to the types of cases that
require the court to “second-guess military strategic, tactical, or policy decisions.” 186 These courts have also been reluctant to apply the
doctrine to the types of cases involving more traditional tort liability,
even if they relate to the military actions occurring inside a war
zone. 187
As pointed out by one court in a suit brought by a soldier injured
by a manufacturing defect in an artillery gun, “[w]hether the manufacturing process was faulty is not a political question; it is a routine
issue of civil, and civilian, tort law.” 188 As further expressed by another court in a similar artillery defect case,
Plaintiffs claim that [defendant] failed to manufacture the mortar cartridge in the way the government
directed. In considering whether the mortar cartridge
was defectively manufactured, this court need not examine the wisdom of the government’s design of the
mortar shell or its decision to use a contractor. [The
defendant’s] liability turns on whether the mortar
cartridge was or was not defectively manufactured, a
matter unrelated to the appropriateness [of] any
Army policy or “the wisdom of military operations

Id. at 1359–60.
Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 705
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (case brought by contractor’s employee, who fell in a latrine located within a forward operating base in Iraq due to its claimed negligent construction was not barred).
187
Id. (“When faced with an ‘ordinary tort suit,’ the textual commitment factor actually weighs in favor of resolution by the judiciary.’”); see also McMahon,
460 F. Supp. 2d at 1321 (“Tort suits are within the province of the judiciary, and
that conclusion is not automatically negated simply because the claim arises in a
military context, or because it bears tangentially on the powers of the executive
and legislative branches.”) (and cases cited therein).
188
McMahon v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 933 F. Supp. 2d 682, 695 (D.N.J.
2013).
185
186

2021]

BLACKWATER RISING

193

and decision-making.” Instead, this court will merely
examine the manufacturer’s performance. 189
On the other hand, the more expansive view is illustrated by the
following statement from Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 190
the objectives of tort law—deterrence, punishment,
and providing a remedy to innocent victims—are inconsistent with the government’s interests in combat,
and thus tort law cannot be applied to government
actions in combat. Similarly, the application of tort
law to contractors for suits arising from combat
would frustrate government combat interests. 191
Typically, in those cases in which the district courts have applied
the doctrine to bar suits against private defendants, the government
has exercised significant control over either the conduct at issue or
the private defendant. 192 Therefore, in applying the Baker factors,
cases often turn on the question of who was controlling the activity
in question at the time of the injury or death and the nature of such
control. 193
As pointed out in a number of circuit court opinions, the issue of
control is generally one of fact and accordingly, where the military
“merely provides the contractor with general guidelines that can be
satisfied at the contractor’s discretion,” sufficient control is often
found to be lacking. 194 For example, in Potts v. Dyncorp International, LLC., an employee of one contractor was seriously injured
while riding in a truck operated by an employee of another contractor being used to transport nonmilitary food supplies under contract
Rodriguez v. Gen. Dynamics Armament and Tech. Prods., Inc., 696 F.
Supp. 2d 1163, 1185 (D. Haw. 2010) (internal citations omitted). See also
McMahon, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1321.
190
Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1493 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
191
Id.
192
See, e.g., Potts v. Dyncorp Int’l LLC, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1251 (M.D.
Ala. 2006) (noting that the government did not control the private contractor).
193
See id. at 1250–51 (reasoning that because defendant’s own policies controlled its conduct, the court would not need to assess U.S. military procedures,
thus, there were no separation of powers concerns).
194
In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 724 F.3d 462, 467 (3d Cir. 2013)).
189
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with the Coalition Provisional Authority (“CPA”). 195 While racing
at speeds over ninety-nine miles per hour on the highways between
Trebil, Jordan and Baghdad, Iraq, the truck swerved to avoid an unknown black object, later identified as a dog, causing it to flip over
several times and explode into flames. 196
In support of the contention that the case involved the adjudication of a political question, the contractor argued that the determination of the plaintiff’s claims would require the court to evaluate the
propriety of the security procedures contained in Dyncorp’s contract
with the CPA, thereby meeting the first Baker factor. 197 The contractor also argued that the second Baker factor was met because the
case revolved around the question of what a reasonable driver would
do when faced with the possibility of hostile fire in a war zone, for
which there were no “judicially discoverable or manageable standards.” 198
In rejecting the first contention, the court noted that Dyncorp’s
contract called for it to be responsible for the day-to-day execution
of its security services, the professional and technical competence
of its employees, and oversight for all its operations. 199 The court
went on to further observe that Dyncorp’s contract “was a civilian
contract to provide non-military security services to non-military
personnel for the purpose of delivering non-military supplies.”200
Accordingly, it concluded that the key inquiry was not the wisdom
of military operations, but merely the sufficiency of Dyncorp’s internal policies and whether it had complied with them under the
terms of its contract. 201
The court likewise rejected the applicability of the second Baker
factor on the grounds that because “Dyncorp was not acting ‘subject
to military regulations and orders,’” the court could utilize normal
tort principles (i.e. whether the driver acted reasonably under the

195
196
197
198
199
200
201

465 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1247–48 (M.D. Ala. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1252.
Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1250–51.
Id at 1253–54.
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circumstances) to determine whether liability existed for the plaintiff’s injuries. 202
A similar ruling was reached in Lessin v. Kellogg Brown & Root,
which involved a serious injury to a soldier who was providing a
military escort to a supply truck convoy. 203 When one of the trucks
in the convoy broke down, the escort was required to stop on the
side of the road in a military zone. 204 While the other soldiers secured the area from potential insurgent attack, the plaintiff assisted
the driver in fixing the truck. 205 During the repairs, the plaintiff was
struck in the head by the truck’s ramp assist arm and sustained serious brain injuries. 206
Although accepting the contractor’s argument that the political
question doctrine could be raised by private entities, 207 the court rejected its application in the case before it. The court concluded that
it did not involve an analysis of military decision-making or the way
government operations were conducted. 208 Instead, the court noted
that the case was “essentially, a traffic accident, involving a commercial truck alleged to have been negligently maintained, as well
as a civilian truck driver who was allegedly negligent in operating
the truck and insufficiently trained.” 209
In Carmichael v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc., however,
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of another convoy case
in which the driver of a tanker rolled over while negotiating a curve
in the road, resulting in severe brain damage to the soldier serving
Id at 1253.
Lessin v. Kellogg Brown & Root, No. CIVA H-05-01853, 2006 WL
3940556, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2006).
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
See id. at *3 n.1 (quoting United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385,
(1990))(“[T]he identity of the litigant is immaterial to the presence of [political
question] concerns in a particular case.”).
208
Id. at 3. (“While the actions taken by Lessin, a military officer, in assisting
the truck will likely be relevant to causation, it is by no means clear that the policies or decisions of the military or of the executive branch itself will be implicated
in this case. It does not follow, therefore, that the case will require initial policy
decisions committed to the discretion of the political branches, or that adjudication of the case will evince a lack of respect for the political branches.”).
209
Id.
202
203
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as a guard. 210 The court reasoned that since the military picked the
time and route of the convoy, set the speed and distance to be maintained between the vehicles, established the security measures to be
taken, and that the “circumstances under which the accident took
place were so thoroughly pervaded by military judgments and decisions,” it would not be possible to determine whether the contractor
had been negligent without judicial scrutiny of these military judgments. 211
Such conflicting results also occur outside of the convoy context
as seen in several cases arising out of attacks on military bases by
suicide bombers. In Smith v. Halliburton Company, the family of a
civilian contractor, who was killed in a suicide bomb attack on a
mess hall in Mosul, Iraq, sued Halliburton, the parent company of
the contractor which operated the dining facility. 212 The suit claimed
that its subsidiary Kellogg Brown & Root, failed to exercise proper
security, thereby allowing the suicide bomber, who was dressed in
an Iraqi military uniform, to walk in and detonate his bomb. 213
The court focused on the contract between the contractor and the
government, which did not place responsibility upon the contractor
to provide security for the base, and found that “[i]n the absence of
any contractual directive to provide security, the Army assigns responsibility for force protection, including security, to the military,
not to civilian contractors . . . . Although contractors may be armed,
they may only be armed for the purpose of individual self-defense.” 214
As a result, the court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the
case was a simple premises liability suit, but instead raised a political question, since it would require the court
to second-guess the decisions of the United States
military, even though the suit is ostensibly against
only military contractors . . . [since] [b]y alleging
that defendants were negligent in providing security
Carmichael v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., 572 F.3d 1271, 1277–78,
1296 (11th Cir. 2009).
211
Id. at 1281–83.
212
Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 2521326, at *1 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 30, 2006).
213
Id.
214
Id. at *3.
210
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[at the facility] . . . plaintiffs are, in effect alleging
that the military was negligent in providing security . . . . 215
In Hencely v. Fluor Corp., Inc., another district court judge held
that a political question was not presented in a suicide bombing occurring on a base operated by a private contractor. 216 In this case,
the perpetrator, who had been a former member of the Taliban, was
an employee of a sub-contractor of the defendant. 217 Although the
bomber had been vetted and placed at the base by the government,
the complaint focused solely upon the claims of the contractor’s subsequent negligent supervision and retention of him. 218 The court rejected the defendant’s attempts to point the finger at the government
for its role in approving the bomber for employment at the base as
part of its defense. 219
A different district judge, however, reached the opposite conclusion in another case arising out of the very same incident in Loquasto
v. Fluor Corp., Inc. 220 Here, the court refused to follow the reasoning utilized in Hencely just seven months earlier. 221
In Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., the Fourth Circuit,
which has been the forum for many of these lawsuits as the home to
several military contractors, sought to simplify and clarify the political question analysis by distilling Baker’s six factors into two questions:
[F]irst . . . “whether the government contractor was
under the ‘plenary’ or ‘direct’ control of the military”
(direct control). Second, . . . whether “national defense interests were ‘closely intertwined’ with military decisions governing the contractor’s conduct,
such that a decision on the merits of the claim ‘would
Id. at *5.
Hencely v. Fluor Corp., Inc., No. 6:19-cv-00489-BHH, 2020 WL 2838687,
at *1 (D.S.C. June 1, 2020).
217
Id. at *8, *9.
218
Id. at *8–12.
219
Id. at *11–12.
220
See Loquasto v. Fluor Corp., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 3d 728, 741 (N.D. Tex.
2021).
221
Id.
215
216
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require the judiciary to question actual, sensitive
judgments made by the military.’” An affirmative response to either of the two . . . factors . . . generally
triggers application of the political question doctrine. 222
Nevertheless, even this simple two factor test has proved difficult to consistently administer as witnessed by the seemingly conflicting conclusions reached in Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. 223 and the two KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litigation opinions.224
In Taylor, a Marine suffered severe injuries when he was electrocuted while installing a back-up generator in a military base in Iraq
after an employee of the contractor turned on the main generator,
despite the Marine Corps’ instructions not to do so. 225 Although
concluding that the contractor was not under the control of the military, the court reasoned that assessing the contractor’s contributory
negligence defense would require it to evaluate military decisions
made by the Marine leadership, such as whether a back-up generator
should have been installed, thereby requiring dismissal of the suit.226
In the first of the court’s subsequent In re KBR, Inc. Burn Pit
Litigation opinions, it utilized a much narrower analysis to reject a
similar argument made by the contractor. 227 In this case, servicemen
and civilian employees sued KBR claiming injuries because of exposure to toxic chemicals caused by the burning of various wastes
prohibited by Department of Defense regulations and by improper
water purification procedures. 228 The court rejected the argument
that a political question was involved simply because the military
had decided to use burn pits, which it considered an “acceptable”

Al-Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech, Inc., 840 F.3d 147, 155 (4th Cir. 2016)
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc.,
658 F.3d 402, 411 (4th Cir. 2011)).
223
See Taylor v. Kelogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 403 (4th
Cir. 2011).
224
See In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 331–32 (4th Cir. 2014);
see also In re KBR, Inc., 893 F.3d 241, 253 (4th Cir. 2018).
225
Taylor, 658 F.3d at 404.
226
Id. at 411–12.
227
In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d at 335.
228
Id. at 332.
222
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but last option for disposing of waste. 229 Although recognizing that
the contractor had produced “some evidence demonstrat[ing] that
the military exercised control over [its] burn pit activities,” conflicting evidence established that the contractor controlled the manner
of the work. 230
The court went on to adopt the analysis utilized by the Third
Circuit in Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc., which involved a wrongful death action brought by the family of a soldier,
who was electrocuted while taking a shower in his barracks. 231 The
family alleged that the contractor, who was charged with maintenance of the facility, failed to properly ground a water pump resulting in the electrocution of their son. 232 The court focused on the element of control over the manner that the particular work in question
was to be performed:
where the military does not exercise control but
merely provides the contractor with general guidelines that can be satisfied at the contractor’s discretion, contractor actions taken within that discretion
do not necessarily implicate unreviewable military
decisions. 233
In reliance upon Harris, the Fourth Circuit similarly concluded
that where the evidence establishes that the military merely provides
the “goals to achieve[,] but not how to achieve them[,]” a political
question is not involved. 234
When the case came back to the court four years later, however,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that additional discovery taken in the
interim established that the military’s control over the waste disposal procedures was “plenary and actual,” requiring dismissal of
the case as presenting a political question. 235

Id. at 336–39.
Id. at 337.
231
Id. at 338–39; Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc.,724 F.3d 462,
462–63 (3d Cir. 2013).
232
Harris, 724 F.3d at 463.
233
Id. at 467.
234
In re KBR, Inc. Burn Pit, 744 F.3d at 339.
235
In re KBR, Inc., 893 F.3d at 241, 261 (4th Cir. 2018).
229
230
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Another issue which has created inconsistencies in the application of the political question doctrine is the willingness of some
courts to look beyond the claims raised by the plaintiff’s complaint
and to analyze the issues that may be implicated by the contractor’s
potential defenses. 236
For example, in Amedi v. BAE Systems, Inc., after a contractor
was killed when a mine resistant ambush protected (“MRAP”) vehicle broke apart upon striking an improvised explosive device
(“IED”), his family sued the manufacturer claiming that it failed to
meet the government’s specifications during construction. 237 Although acknowledging that the plaintiff’s claims of manufacturing
defects would likely not raise political questions, the court nevertheless held that the defendant’s likely defenses, which pointed the finger at the military for negligence in the convoy formation, the route
selected, and the sufficiency of safeguards to avoid IEDs, would
raise such issues—requiring a dismissal of the case. 238
Other courts, however, have refused to allow the defendant to
define the political question analysis in such a manner. A good example is McMahon v. General Dynamics Corp., which involved another battlefield products liability claim, this time by a soldier who
was seriously injured when a machine gun misfired. 239 Although the
plaintiff only challenged the contractor’s manufacture of the
weapon, the defendant “state[ed] that it [would] defend itself in a
manner that [would] drag the Court into exacting evaluations of the
Army’s policies and the actions of its soldiers.” 240
The court rejected the product manufacturer’s argument, observing that it
236

2011).

See Amedi v. BAE Systems, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1357 (N.D. Ga.

Id. at 1351–52; see also Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658
F.3d 402, 409 (in evaluating these factors, the court “look[s] beyond the complaint, [and] considers how [the service members] might prove [their] claim[s]
and how KBR would defend”); Carmichael v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., 572
F.3d 1271, 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009) (dismissing case which arose out of alleged negligent operation of a vehicle in a military convoy, because of the contractor’s defense that military decisions caused the accident).
238
Amendi, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 1357–58.
239
McMahon v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 933 F. Supp. 2d 682, 685–686 (D.N.J.
2013).
240
Id. at 695.
237
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is too broad; it would give the defendants too much
power to define the issues. Indeed, it would bar virtually any claim in which the contractor posited that
the military, not itself, was at fault. In the great majority of cases dismissing claims on political question
grounds, the allegedly faulty exercise of military
judgment was the basis of the complaint, not of a hypothetical defense. McMahon does not challenge any
order he was given, or indeed anything that occurred
in Afghanistan. His allegation of a manufacturing defect could stand alone without implicating any decision committed to the discretion of the military. 241
The difficulties which the political question analysis have
caused the courts is demonstrated by the legal journey of four negligent convoy cases originally decided by the same district court
judge: Fisher v. Halliburton, Inc., 242 Smith-Idol v. Halliburton,243
Lane v. Halliburton, 244 and Woodson v. Halliburton. 245 The judge
originally dismissed each of the cases on the grounds that they presented political questions, concluding that under the defendant’s
contract with the government, and regulations issued by the Army
to define the respective roles of the military forces and the contractor, that “the Army was, at the very least, significantly involved in
transportation and force protection decisions.” 246
Following the dismissals, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the cases 247 back to the district court to determine whether they could be resolved “without needing to make a
constitutionally impermissible review of war time decision
241

Id.
Fisher v. Halliburton, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 637, 645 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
243
Smith-Idol v. Halliburton, No. H-06-1168, 2006 WL 2927685, at *1, *2
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 2006).
244
Lane v. Halliburton, No. H-06-1971, 2006 WL 2796249, at *1, *2 (S.D.
Tex. Sept. 26, 2006).
245
Woodson v. Halliburton, No. H-06-2107, 2006 WL 2796228, at *1, *2
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2006).
246
See Fisher, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 643.
247
Three of the four dismissals were appealed: See e.g., Lane, 2006 WL
2796249, at *1; Smith-Idol, 2006 WL 2927685, at *1; and Fisher, 454 F. Supp.
2d at 645.
242
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making.” 248 After allowing the parties extensive discovery and utilizing the analytical standards established by the Fifth Circuit, the
district judge concluded the second time around that the cases did
not in fact involve political questions, since their focus was not on
the military’s gathering of information, but instead on Halliburton’s
use of it after it was communicated. 249
While therefore denying the motion to dismiss based upon the
political question doctrine, the district judge nevertheless granted
the contractor’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
the plaintiffs’ actions were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Defense Base Act. 250 When the cases reached the Fifth
Circuit for the second time, 251 the court upheld the summary judgments under the DBA, but decided that it did not need to revisit the
political question issue. 252
The ultimate takeaway from these cases is that the complex and
interdependent nature of the contractor-military relationship, which
characterized the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, makes it necessary
to focus on the specific allegations of negligence in each case.
Where the case challenges actions by the contractor which have the
potential to implicate military decisions or actions, it is more likely
that a political question will be found. 253 Where, however, the case
is directed to the contractor’s failure to comply with government
regulations as adopted, its misuse of information provided by the
military or its own failure to exercise reasonable care, the case is
more likely to be subject to normal civil tort principles. 254
A good example of the application of such analysis is seen in
McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., where both the government

Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 568 (5th Cir. 2008).
See Fisher v. Halliburton, 696 F. Supp. 2d 710, 722–23 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
250
See Smith-Idol v. Halliburton, No. H-06-1168, 2010 WL 2196268, at *1
(S.D. Tex. May 27, 2010).
251
See Fisher v. Halliburton, 667 F.3d 602, 603 (5th Cir. 2012). The Lane case
was settled prior to the appeal, leaving only Fisher and Smith-Idol for the second
appeal.
252
Fisher, 667 F.3d at 606.
253
Smith-Idol, 2006 WL 2927685, at *1–2.
254
Fisher, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 722–23.
248
249
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and the contractor shared responsibilities for the flights in question. 255 The court first delineated each party’s obligations: 256
On the most general level, the SOW [statement of
work] 257 required Presidential to “[p]rovide all fixedwing aircraft, personnel, equipment, tools, material,
maintenance, and supervision necessary . . . for the
missions DoD requested . . . . The SOW further gave
Presidential the ultimate responsibility for ensuring
the safety of the flights it was operating . . . . [T]he
military’s duties (according to the SOW) were relatively discrete. The military chose the start and end
points of the flights, and chose when the flights
would be flown (qualified by Presidential’s power to
decline a mission for safety reasons). The military
also imposed certain constraints on Presidential’s exercise of its supervisory responsibilities. It limited
the working hours of Presidential’s pilots; specified
minimum requirements for the aircraft; set out minimum and maximum amounts of passengers and
cargo; and contained a provision requiring Presidential employees to comply with General Order One
(which contained general rules of conduct for all service members in Afghanistan). 258

255

2007).

McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331,1361 (11th Cir.

Id. at 1360–61.
Id. at 1360, 1336 (statements of work are issued by the military to define
the contractor’s specific responsibilities under its umbrella contract with the government); Carmichael v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., 572 F.3d 1271, 1276 n.
2 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting the umbrella contract between the contractor and the
military is made under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (“LOGAP”),
which “define[s] the general contours of the military’s relationship with civilian
contractors.” The specific nature of the relationship is “further governed by a
patchwork of other agreements and instruments,” including the Army Field Manual, Department of Defense directives and “Statements of Work (SOW) and Task
Orders (TO) by which the contract is implemented”); see also In re KBR, Inc.,
Burn Pit Litigation, 744 F.3d 326, 332, 337 (4th Cir. 2014).
258
McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1360–61 (emphasis added).
256
257
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The court then looked to the plaintiff’s specific claims of negligence: 259
McMahon’s allegations [do not] relate to any of these
discrete areas of military responsibility. She does not
challenge the military’s scheduling of the flights; the
force protection the military provided on the base; or
the military’s generalized restrictions on Presidential
employees while they were on the base pursuant to
General Order One. Rather, her allegations relate
principally to the operation of the flight, for which
Presidential retained residual responsibility under the
terms of the SOW. McMahon alleges “[n]egligent . . . entrusting an aircraft to a flight crew inexperienced in flying the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan”; “. . . failure to conduct a formal route
study”; “. . . failure to properly plan and execute
the . . . flight”; and other challenges to the operational details of the flight. 260
As a result, the court concluded that the prosecution of the case
would not require a reexamination of any decision made by the military thereby rendering the political question doctrine inapplicable. 261
The type of analysis undertaken in McMahon recognizes the important underlying principle emphasized in Klinghoffer v. S.N.C.
Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, that “the doctrine ‘is one of “political questions,” not one of “political cases.’” The fact that the issues
before us arise in a politically charged context does not convert what
is essentially an ordinary tort suit into a non-justiciable political
question.” 262

Id. at 1361.
Id.
261
Id. at 1360, 1365.
262
Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted)(suit by family of passenger against the PLO arising from
the hijacking of a cruise ship was not subject to dismissal as raising a political
question).
259
260
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B.
Sovereign Immunity and the Feres Doctrine
Some contractors have claimed a direct entitlement to sovereign
immunity under the so-called Feres doctrine, which bars a soldier
from recovery against the government under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (“FTCA”) for injuries which “arise out of or are in the
course of activity incident to service.” 263 For example, in McMahon
v. Presidential Airways, Inc., the contractor argued that “‘as military
contractors operating in a combat zone,’ they should share in the
Government’s sovereign immunity because ‘the reality of modern
warfare’ is that contractors perform traditional military functions . . . characterizing their role as part of the ‘Total Force.’” 264
The contractor based its argument on the contention that the
plaintiffs’ status as servicemen was the critical element of the Feres
doctrine and not the government’s role as the defendant. 265 The district court rejected this argument, holding that “Feres has never been
applied to protect private parties from tort liability.” 266
The rejection of the Feres doctrine to a private contractor is
clearly required by both the wording of the FTCA and the Feres
opinion itself. 267 The FTCA expressly excludes contractors from the
scope of the Act. 268
As used in this chapter . . . the term “Federal agency”
includes the executive departments, the judicial and
legislative branches, the military departments, independent establishments of the United States, and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or
agencies of the United States, but does not include
any contractor with the United States. 269
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (Feres was a serviceman
who died in a barrack’s fire as an alleged result of the Army’s negligence in using
an unsafe facility and in failing to maintain an adequate fire watch. Two other
cases based upon claimed medical malpractice of Army surgeons were consolidated with it in the Supreme Court).
264
McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1325 (M.D.
Fla. 2006).
265
Id. at 1325–26.
266
Id. at 1328.
267
Feres, 340 U.S. at 141–42; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2671.
268
28 U.S.C. § 2671.
269
Id. (emphasis added).
263
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Such a contention is also inconsistent with the Court’s holding
in Feres, which allows recovery against the government for “tort
claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances . . . .” 270 In analyzing this issue, the
Court looked to the role of the FTCA and the history of sovereign
immunity in the United States, concluding that the Act did not create
new remedies against the government, but merely waived sovereign
immunity for existing causes of action applicable to private parties
under the same circumstances. 271 Finding a lack of equivalent remedies in the private sphere, the Court held, “[w]e know of no American law which ever has permitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against either his superior officers or the Government he is
serving.” 272
The indispensable role of the federal government as the defendant to the application of the Feres doctrine was further emphasized
by the Court’s subsequent decision in United States v. Johnson.273
In this case, the Eleventh Circuit previously held that the claims asserted by the families of Coast Guard rescuers, whose helicopter
crashed during a mission, were not barred by Feres, since the
claimed negligence was that of civilian FAA employees. 274 The Supreme Court rejected this conclusion, explaining that the critical factor was the role of the federal government as the defendant, not the
job description of the employees whose negligence gave rise to the
claim. 275
As a result, those courts which have considered the attempted
extension of the Feres doctrine to military contractors, have rejected
the argument on the grounds that since sovereign immunity is only
applicable to the government, the Feres exception to the statutory
waiver of sovereign immunity can only apply to suits by servicemen
against the government. 276
Feres, 340 U.S. at 141 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674).
Id. at 142.
272
Id. at 141 (emphasis added).
273
United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 691–92 (1987).
274
See Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530, 1540 (11th Cir. 1985).
275
Johnson, 481 U.S. at 689–90.
276
See, e.g., Chapman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 911 F.2d 267, 272 (9th
Cir. 1990); Durant v. Neneman, 884 F.2d 1350, 1354 (10th Cir. 1989); McMahon
v. v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315 aff’d 502 F.3d 1331, 1352–
53; Ammend v. BioPort, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 848, 879 (W.D. Mich 2004); see
270
271
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In reaching this conclusion, the courts have focused on the identity of the defendant, rather than the nature of the work being performed. 277
The [Supreme] Court emphasized that “[t]he congruence of professional interests between contractors
and the Federal Government is not complete” because “the contractors remained distinct entities pursuing private ends, and their actions remained commercial activities carried on for profit.
This reasoning is helpful. Westinghouse’s private
profit objectives in operating under the contract establish it as an entity distinct from the government. 278
Perhaps in recognition of the foregoing, on appeal the contractor
in McMahon refined its argument to contend that “it was a common
law agent of the federal government at the time of the accident, and
is therefore entitled to the sovereign immunity the government
might have under the Feres doctrine. [This] argument relies on the
doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity.” 279
The doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity originated in the
case of Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Const. Co., which involved a claim by
a landowner against a contractor building dikes in the Missouri
River under contract with the federal government in exercising its
eminent domain power. 280 The specific work was being performed
under the direction of the Secretary of War and the supervision of
the Chief of Engineers of the United States. 281 The Court concluded
that where the agent was acting within the express authority validly
granted by the government “[t]he action of the agent is ‘the act of
the government.’” 282
also Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 502 F.2d 867, 874–75 (8th Cir. 1974)
(refusing to extend sovereign immunity to grenade manufacturer for a Vietnam
training accident).
277
Chapman, 911 F.2d at 271.
278
Id. (citation omitted).
279
McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1341.
280
Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 19 (1940).
281
Id.
282
Id. at 22.
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As observed by the Sixth Circuit in Adkisson v. Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc., 283 a non-military contractor case, “Yearsley’s
spare reasoning, however, creates uncertainty as to the scope of the
decision.” 284 Nevertheless, several circuit court decisions have relied upon the doctrine in different contexts to shield contractors from
liability where they were performing actions for which the government itself would be immune from suit. 285
The doctrine has not fared very well, however, when raised by
military contractors in cases arising out of combat hostilities. In
Bynum v. FMC Corporation, 286 which involved a claim by a National Guardsman for injuries due to the alleged negligent manufacture of a military vehicle, the Fifth Circuit noted that “[t]he difficulty
of establishing a traditional agency relationship with the government
makes the derivative sovereign immunity defense ill-suited to many
manufacturers of military equipment.” 287
See Adkisson v. Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc., 790 F.3d 641, 646–647
(6th Cir. 2015) (noting that the doctrine can only be applicable where the contractor is performing acts for which the government would be immune. In this case
the underlying legal question was whether the government would have been liable
under the FTCA if it had been the negligent actor).
284
Id. The doctrine was revisited by the Court in several more recent cases,
but without fully filling in its scope. See, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377,
393–94 (U.S. 2012) (holding that an attorney hired by a city to assist it in conducting an investigation into an employee’s potential wrongdoing was entitled to
the same qualified immunity for his actions as city employees in performing the
same activities); Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 166, 168–69 (U.S.
2016) (holding that an advertising company hired by the Navy to text recruiting
messages to young adults was not entitled to immunity for failing to follow the
terms of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act).
285
See, e.g., Butters v. Vance Int’l, Inc., 225 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding
a private contractor was entitled to derivative sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act for following the commands of a foreign sovereign
in refusing to promote female employee); Ackerson v. Bean Dredging LLC, 589
F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding dredging companies were entitled to immunity
for environmental damages caused by their activities performed pursuant to contracts with federal government); Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580 (9th Cir.
1963) (holding a contractor could not be held liable for trespass in constructing a
highway in conformance with the terms of a contract with the federal government
by landowners claiming that the construction exceeded government right-ofway).
286
770 F.2d 556, 564 (5th Cir. 1985).
287
Id.
283
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Noting that it had previously “never upheld a claim of derivative
sovereign immunity,” the Eleventh Circuit in McMahon concluded
that “if it in fact exists,” which it declined to decide, it would require
that the entity seeking immunity “must at a bare minimum have been
a common law agent of the government.” 288 Even where such a relationship existed, however, the court warned that would not be
enough by itself to invest a private entity with sovereign immunity. 289
Since the contractor sought entitlement to sovereign immunity
solely by virtue of its claimed status as a common law agent, the
Eleventh Circuit rejected the application of the Feres doctrine to
it. 290 Nevertheless, after a detailed analysis of the policies underlying the Feres doctrine, the court concluded that while it was not applicable, there still might be some limited form of immunity due to
contractors in “their making or executing sensitive military judgments.” 291 However, the Eleventh Circuit did not find that the Feres
“incident to service” standard provided the proper test for determining when such immunity was appropriate. 292 Accordingly, the court
went on to hold that even if such immunity could hypothetically exist that it would not be appropriate in this case. 293
The only other circuit courts to consider this question in the military contractor context are the Fourth and Ninth circuits. 294 In
Chapman v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 295 which involved a personal injury claim by a Navy enlisted man who was injured as a
result of the collapse of a deck at a government owned reactor, the
Ninth Circuit likewise rejected the application of the defense, focusing on the difference between the government’s objectives and the
contractors profit motive. 296 Accordingly, the court concluded that

502 F.3d at 1343.
Id. at 1344.
290
Id. at 1346.
291
Id. at 1350–51.
292
Id. at 1351.
293
Id. at 1355–56.
294
See generally Chapman v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 911 F.2d 267 (9th
Cir. 1990); In re KBR, Inc. Burn Pit Litig., 925 F. Supp. 2d 752 (D. Md. 2013).
295
911 F.2d 267, 268 (9th Cir. 1990).
296
Id. at 271 (quoting U.S. v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 738–40 (1982))
(holding that private companies operating atomic research facilities under contract
288
289
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the contractor could not be considered a government employee,
thereby precluding the application of sovereign immunity. 297
In In re KBR, Inc. Burn Pit Litigation, however, the Fourth Circuit held that the defense could be applicable in the contractor setting but concluded that the district court had improperly applied it
to dismiss the claims of both soldiers and employees seeking to recover for injuries claimed to have occurred from exposure to toxic
chemicals caused by burning waste in huge pits. 298 The court held
that for the defense to be applicable, it was not enough for the government to merely set the general scope or parameters of a project. 299 Instead, it must establish specific instructions, which the
contractor was strictly following at the time. 300 Accordingly, where
the contractor has discretion in performing its activities, derivative
sovereign immunity cannot apply. 301
C.

Government Contractor Defense and Combat Activities
Exception
As a result of the refusal of most courts to allow the direct application of sovereign immunity to non-governmental entities, military contractors have subsequently raised several new defenses
seeking to obtain their own analogous version of immunity by relying upon exclusions applicable to the government under the FTCA.
The first successful foray into this area gave rise to the “government
contractor defense.” 302 This defense, in turn, led to the recognition
by some courts of what is now commonly called the “combat
with the Department of Energy were not government employees entitled to immunity from state taxation).
297
Id.
298
744 F.3d 331, 331 (4th Cir. 2014), rev’g, 925 F. Supp. 2d 752, 753 (D. Md.
2013).
299
Id. at 345–46.
300
Id. at 338–39.
301
See Harris v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., No. 08-563, 2016 WL
4720058, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2016); Vangjeli v. Banks, No. 19-1635, 2020
WL 5880131, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2020) (discussing difference between derivative sovereign immunity and official immunity doctrines).
302
See, e.g., Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405–06 (4th Cir. 1986);
Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 560 (5th Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.J. Case Co.,
756 F.2d 591, 596–97 (7th Cir. 1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int’l, 704 F.2d 444,
448 (9th Cir. 1983).
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activities exception.” 303 As with the application of the political question doctrine, there has been disparate treatment by the courts in determining the applicability and scope of these defenses.
Several Circuit Court decisions initially adopted the government
contractor defense 304 as an adjunct to the Feres doctrine. 305 These
courts concluded that to allow claims against contractors for injuries
to Armed Service personnel sustained in the course of military service would defeat the purpose behind the Feres doctrine since the
increased cost of the contractor’s tort liability would be added to
contracts, which “pass-through costs . . . would . . . defeat the purpose of the immunity for military accidents conferred upon the government itself.” 306
In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. which involved a suit
against a helicopter manufacturer by the family of a Marine pilot,
who drowned following a crash because he could not get the emergency hatch to open, the Supreme Court recognized the defense, but
rejected the underlying analysis utilized by these lower courts. 307
Noting that sovereign immunity does not apply to private entities,
the Court instead turned to a preemption analysis:
Petitioner’s broadest contention is that, in the absence of legislation specifically immunizing Government contractors from liability for design defects,
there is no basis for judicial recognition of such a defense. We disagree. In most fields of activity, to be
sure, this Court has refused to find federal pre-emption of state law in the absence of either a clear statutory prescription, or a direct conflict between federal and state law. But we have held that a few areas,
involving “uniquely federal interests,” are so committed by the Constitution and laws of the United
States to federal control that state law is pre-empted
and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a
See, e.g., Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333–34 (9th Cir. 1992);
Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1492 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
304
See, e.g., Tozer, 792 F.2d at 403; Bynum, 770 F.2d at 556; Tillett, 756 F.2d
at 591; McKay, 704 F.2d at 444.
305
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
306
See, e.g., Tozer, 792 F.2d at 408.
307
487 U.S. 500, 502–03, 510 (1988).
303
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content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts — so-called “federal common
law.”
The dispute in the present case borders upon two areas that we have found to involve such “uniquely
federal interests.” We have held that obligations to
and rights of the United States under its contracts are
governed exclusively by federal law.
Another area that we have found to be of peculiarly
federal concern, warranting the displacement of state
law, is the civil liability of federal officials for actions taken in the course of their duty. We have held
in many contexts that the scope of that liability is
controlled by federal law. The present case involves
an independent contractor performing its obligation
under a procurement contract, rather than an official
performing his duty as a federal employee, but there
is obviously implicated the same interest in getting
the Government’s work done. 308
Although finding that the procurement of military equipment by
the United States was an area of “uniquely federal interest,” the
Court held that this alone was not enough to preempt state law allowing tort recovery. 309 Instead, it concluded that preemption would
only occur where: “a ‘significant conflict’ exists between an identifiable ‘federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state law,’ or
the application of state law would ‘frustrate specific objectives’ of
federal legislation.” 310
The Court then looked to the discretionary function exception to
the Federal Tort Claims Act 311 as the basis for determining whether
such a “significant conflict” existed:

Id. at 504–05 (citations omitted).
Id. at 507–08.
310
Id. at 507 (citations omitted).
311
28 U.S.C. §2680(a) (excepting “[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty”
from the waiver of sovereign immunity).
308
309
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We think that the selection of the appropriate design
for military equipment to be used by our Armed
Forces is assuredly a discretionary function within
the meaning of this provision. It often involves not
merely engineering analysis but judgment as to the
balancing of many technical, military, and even social considerations, including specifically the tradeoff between greater safety and greater combat effectiveness. And we are further of the view that permitting “second-guessing” of these judgments through
state tort suits against contractors would produce the
same effect sought to be avoided by the FTCA exemption. 312
As a result, the Court went on to hold that this test would only
be met in claims against manufacturers based upon alleged design
defects in military equipment when: (1) the government approved
the precise specifications, (2) the equipment complied with the specifications, and (3) the supplier warned the government purchaser of
the dangers in the use of the equipment. 313
As noted by some lower court decisions, “[s]tripped to its essentials, the military contractor’s defense under Boyle is to claim, ‘The
Government made me do it.’” 314
Subsequent lower court decisions have reached divergent conclusions over the reach of Boyle. Some cases have refused to extend
the defense beyond its origins, limiting it to those product liability

487 U.S. at 511 (citations omitted).
Id. at 512. Multiple circuit court decisions have weighed whether military
contractors have carried their burden of establishing these elements. See Getz v.
Boeing Co., 654 F.3d 852, 868 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding summary judgment for
contractor which designed helicopter pursuant to government approved specifications that did not call for safety device that may have prevented crash); Brinson
v. Raytheon Co., 571 F.3d 1348, 1349 (11th Cir. 2009) (affirming summary judgment for the designer of the military aircraft).
314
Copeland v. 3M Co., No. 20-1490 (JRT/KMM), 2020 WL 5748114, at *2
(D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2020) (finding the government contractor defense inapplicable to claims of hearing damage against a manufacturer of combat arms earplugs)
(quoting In re Joint E. & S. Dist. New York Asbestos Litig. v. Eagle-Picher Indus.,
Inc., 897 F.2d 626, 632 (2d Cir. 1990)).
312
313
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design cases where the three express conditions are met. 315 Other
courts have extended the defense beyond merely negligent design to
other products liability type claims involving the negligent manufacture of military products, 316 failure to warn of product dangers, 317
and even to the provision of maintenance services. 318
Still, others have stretched Boyle beyond the provision of products and maintenance services to immunize other activities by contractors for which the military would be protected by sovereign immunity, such as in the cases arising out of the abuses of prisoners of
war at the notorious Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. 319 These latter decisions have created a new hybrid type defense based upon the “combat activities exception” to the FTCA, which provides that the government does not waive its sovereign immunity from suits regarding
“[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military
or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.” 320
One of the leading cases to adopt this new hybrid defense is
Koohi v. United States, in which the Ninth Circuit construed Boyle
to bar wrongful death claims arising from the shooting down of an
Iranian civilian plane carrying 290 passengers by the USS Vincennes. 321 Using the Aegis Air Defense System, manufactured by
See, e.g., Chapman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 911 F.2d 267, 272 (9th
Cir. 1990) (analyzing the case of a Navy enlisted man injured in the collapse of a
nuclear reactor facility); Fisher v. Halliburton, 390 F. Supp. 2d 610, 615–16 (S.D.
Tex. 2005) (refusing to apply defense to claims by civilians injured and killed in
convoy operated by contractors, which were attacked by insurgents in Iraq).
316
See, e.g., In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 995–96,
1001–02 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying defense to cases based upon negligent manufacture).
317
See, e.g., Tate v. Boeing Helicopters, 55 F.3d 1150, 1151–52,1156–58 (6th
Cir. 1995); Getz, 654 F.3d at 867. The Ninth Circuit limited its prior opinion in
Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 89 F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 1996), which had refused to apply the defense to a failure to warn case.
318
Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir.
2003) (holding defense available to service contractor for the alleged negligent
failure to discover a stress crack in fin spar that led to crash of Army helicopter,
where it followed government’s maintenance procedures); LaCourse v. PAE
Worldwide, Inc., 980 F.3d 1350, 1362 (11th Cir. 2020) (affirming summary judgment for contractor which allegedly failed to properly service and maintain F-16
that crashed, killing pilot).
319
See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
320
28 U.S.C. §2680(j) (emphasis added).
321
976 F.2d 1328, 1337 (9th Cir. 1992).
315
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several government contractors, the battleship mistook the civilian
airbus for an Iranian F-14 during a time of heightened hostilities between the United States and Iran arising out of the decade-long IranIraq war. 322
Although acknowledging that sovereign immunity would not directly shield the private contractors that had manufactured the Aegis
system from liability, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the application
of the FTCA’s combatant activities exception nevertheless removed
any duty of care owed by either the government or the contractors
“to those against whom force is directed as a result of authorized
military action.” 323 Reading Boyle as holding “preemption [to be]
appropriate when imposition of liability on [a] defense contractor
‘will produce [the] same effect sought to be avoided by the FTCA
exception,” 324 the Ninth Circuit went on to conclude that liability
therefore could not be asserted against the contractors for the same
reason as against the government. 325
In Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., a California district court
judge relied upon Koohi to expand Boyle’s reach even further in a
case arising from the death of six Marines during the first Gulf War
due to an errant missile strike by a U.S. Air Force jet. 326 In suing the
manufacturer for a claimed defect in the missile’s guidance system,
the plaintiffs tried to circumvent Boyle by claiming that the missile
was defectively manufactured, rather than improperly designed. 327
The government took the unusual step of intervening in the lawsuit
to assert that the continued progression of the case would damage
national security, since it would result in the disclosure of highly
classified information concerning the design of its Maverick missile
system. 328

Id. at 1329–30.
Id. at 1337.
324
Id. Interestingly, the court did not reference the earlier decision of a different panel from the circuit in Chapman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 911 F.2d 267
(9th Cir. 1990), which utilized a straight analysis of the three Boyle factors to hold
that the government contractor defense was inapplicable to a suit by a Navy enlisted man in the collapse of a nuclear reactor facility.
325
Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1337 (9th Cir. 1992).
326
833 F. Supp. 1486, 1487, 1494 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
327
Id.at 1489.
328
Id. at 1496–97.
322
323
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Although the court could have easily remained on the path of
existing precedent by dismissing the case on the limited grounds that
Boyle applied to claims of both design and manufacturing defects or
by simply relying upon the state secrets doctrine, 329 it instead embarked upon a broad tirade against allowing recovery for any war
time injuries as an affront to “military dignity,” regardless of cause
or responsibility: 330
“War produces innumerable innocent victims of
harmful conduct—on all sides. It would make little
sense to single out for special compensation a few of
these persons . . . on the basis that they have suffered
from the negligence of our military forces rather than
from the overwhelming and pervasive violence
which each side intentionally inflicts on the other.”
This principle applies even when the suit is against a
government contractor, rather than the government
itself. There can be no difference in compensation for
those that die in war, even when the cause is a manufacturing defect.
Indeed, the federal interest in maintaining the military dignity of casualties suffered by soldiers fighting
a war on behalf of the United States would be harmed
by allowing soldiers killed or injured in war to bring
suits against military contractors. Unfortunately, soldiers die and are injured in combat. Casualties are
contemplated prior to war and judged to be a necessary consequence of the decision to go to war. 331
Implicit in the court’s reasoning is the view that soldiers are war
time expendables that do not deserve the same protections of the law
for their safety as afforded to everyday consumers, because of the
perceived need for military weapons manufacturers to avoid delays
necessary to make their products safe: 332
See id. at 1492. The court found both defenses applicable to the case. For
a more detailed discussion of the state secrets doctrine, see infra Section II. D.
330
Bentzlin, 833 F. Supp at 1494.
331
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
332
Id. at 1493–94.
329
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[T]ort law is based in large part on deterrence; tort
liability is meant to make tortfeasors more careful . . . . During wartime, manufacturers similarly
should not be made overly cautious in the production
and transportation of weapons . . . . Exposing government contractors to tort liability, even for manufacturing defects, would place undue pressure on
manufacturers to act too cautiously, even when the
national interest would be better served by expedient
production than defect-free weapons. 333
This same rationale also formed the basis for the dismissal of a
products liability suit against the manufacturer of a pilot’s safety
equipment, which was claimed to have caused his death when his
Apache helicopter crashed in Afghanistan, in Flanigan v. Westwind
Technologies, Inc. 334 Building upon Bentzlin’s argument that manufacturers of military weapons should not be bogged down by the
tort system’s concern for making safe products, the court went on to
urge blanket immunity for such manufacturers by perversely twisting Koohi’s statement that the FTCA’s combatant activities exception removed any duty of care owed to enemy combatants to apply
with equal vigor to “actions arising from the deaths of American
soldiers in combat based upon product liability.” 335
The radical extension of Boyle by these cases has been rejected
by many courts utilizing a variety of different rationales. Some
courts have refused to apply the combatant activities exception to
cases arising outside of the product liability field, reasoning that tort
judgments in such cases will not subvert “any sophisticated design
judgments or nuanced exercises of [military] discretion” inherent in
the procurement process, which constituted a critical aspect of
Boyle’s analysis. 336 Other courts have rejected the application of the
Id. at 1493.
648 F. Supp. 2d 994, 995, 1007 (W.D. Tenn. 2008).
335
Id. at 1004–05.
336
McMahon v. General Dynamics Corp., 933 F. Supp. 2d 682, 689, 692
(D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he discretionary function exception does not apply to a mistake or defect in manufacturing. Such a process error is not a governmental, discretionary decision.”); see Fisher v. Halliburton, 390 F. Supp. 2d 710, 720–21
(S.D. Tex. 2005) (refusing to apply the defense to claims arising out of the negligent operation of a convoy in Iraq); Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs.,
333
334
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defense by taking a restrictive view of the nature of the required
“combatant” activities. 337
Still others have taken a fact-based approach to determine
whether the purposes of tort law would be met by allowing the case
to go forward. For example, in Getz v. Boeing Co., a different California district judge contrasted the plaintiffs in the case before him,
who were the survivors of U.S. military personnel that died in a helicopter crash in Afghanistan, with the plaintiffs in Koohi, who were
citizens of Iran, which was involved in military hostilities with the
United States at the time. 338
Using this analysis, she construed Koohi as “focus[ing] on
whether the purposes of tort law would be furthered by requiring
weapons manufacturers to extend a duty of care to ‘enemy forces or
persons associated with those forces,’” which it answered in the negative. 339 Getz, on the other hand, “concern[ed] extending the duty of
care to United States servicemen, the people the helicopter was designed to protect.” 340 The lack of a duty of care owed to enemies in
Inc., 450 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1377–81 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (refusing to apply to injuries
arising from the negligent operation of a vehicle in a convoy by a contractor’s
employee); Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 1342823, at *5
(S.D. Tex. May 16, 2006) (refusing to apply to claim for injuries caused by negligent security which allowed suicide bomber entry into Army mess hall).
337
See, e.g., Brokaw v. Boeing Co., 137 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1106 (N.D. Ill.
2015) (holding that the transportation of military equipment by plane into a war
zone did not constitute a combatant activity, while questioning whether the defense can be applied to contractors); McManaway v. KBR, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 2d
654, 666 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (holding contractor responsible for water and waste
treatment at U.S. bases in Iraq did not involve combatant activity), appeal dismissed, No. 12–20763, 2013 WL 8359992 (5th Cir. Nov. 7, 2013); Linfoot v. MD
Helicopters, Inc., No. 3:09–0639, 2010 WL 4659482, at *7–8 (M.D. Tenn. Nov.
9, 2010) (holding a helicopter crash in Iraq occurring as a result of a product
defect rather than enemy fire did not constitute combatant activity); Rodriguez v.
General Dynamics Armament and Tech. Prods., Inc., 696 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1186–
89 (D. Hawaii 2010) (holding the combatant activities exception did not extend
to injuries caused by a premature exploding motor round during training exercises
in Hawaii). But see Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs. Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d
698,711–13 (the design, operation and maintenance of toilet facilities located on
a forward operating base was held to constitute combatant activity).
338
Getz v. Boeing Co., No. C 07–06396 CW., 2009 WL 636039, at *4–6
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2009).
339
Id. at *4.
340
Id.
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war does not apply to our own military personnel.” 341 Accordingly,
the court found the combatant activity exception inapplicable. 342
Similarly, McMahon v. General Dynamics Corp. 343 criticized
the express reliance in Koohi and Bentzlin upon the perceived need
to free weapons manufacturers from the safety constraints of the tort
system, which would require them to “exercise great caution at a
time when bold and imaginative measures might be necessary to
overcome enemy forces . . . .” 344
True, the duty of care should not constrain our soldiers from taking “bold and imaginative measures”
in battle. But reckless bravery is not the quality we
look for in a supplier of materiel. A manufacturer like
General Dynamics should not act in a spirit of bold
improvisation; it should follow specifications scrupulously and exercise the highest level of care in the
manufacturing process. 345
McMahon went on to take further aim at the rationale expressed
by those cases claiming that it was necessary to sacrifice the safety
of soldiers in a time of war: 346
I am not persuaded by all of Bentzlin’s reasoning. I
am not convinced, for example, that fear of claims
like McMahon’s would induce General Dynamics to
slow down its operations. Nor does anyone claim that
a military exigency required that General Dynamics
relax its safety standards to hasten production. I cannot meaningfully correlate the need to encourage
“bold and imaginative” battle tactics to the manner
or the rate at which guns come off of a U.S. assembly
341

Id.
Id. at *4–6.
343
McMahon v. General Dynamics Corp., 933 F. Supp. 2d 682, 691 (D.N.J.
2013) (refusing to apply the combatant activity exception to shield a manufacturer
from a claim by a soldier who was allegedly injured as a result of a defect in a
machine gun causing it to misfire).
344
Id. at 690 (quoting Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328,1334–35 (9th
Cir. 1992)).
345
McMahon, 933 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
346
Id. at 691–92.
342
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line. Nor do I believe that tort law loses its salutary
capacity to encourage care, punish negligence and
spread the cost of accidents, simply because the customer happens to be the government . . . . The tort
system, here as elsewhere, can help enforce the highest standard of care in the production of the equipment upon which our servicemen and servicewomen
rely. That safety and deterrence rationale, of course,
has no application to the enemy, as Koohi implies . . . . It is a fact of life that the enemy seeks to
injure us; that is no reason to forgo the best means
we have of ensuring that we do not injure ourselves. 347
Other cases have recognized the combatant activities exception
but have rejected the Koohi approach to determine its applicability,
instead focusing upon the extent of the government’s control over
the activity in question. One such case is Saleh v. Titan Corp., which
involved claims brought by several Iraqi detainees against military
contractors based upon their torture in the infamous Abu Ghraib
prison by both U.S. servicemen and the contractors’ employees. 348
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the defense would
only apply to contractors, “[d]uring wartime, where a private service
contractor is integrated into combatant activities over which the military retains command authority . . . .” 349
From a legal standpoint, the rationale for transforming the limited government contractor defense into a new broad scale combatant activities exception is conceptually unsound for a number of reasons. The essence of the government contractor defense is that the
manufacturer is immune from being sued because it followed the
military’s specifications in designing a weapons system.350
347

Id.
580 F.3d 1, 1–2 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
349
Id. at 9. In Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc., 724 F.3d 458,
481–82 (3d Cir. 2013), the Third Circuit adopted this test, finding the defense
inapplicable to the claim of a soldier, who was electrocuted while taking a shower
as a result of the negligent installation of an ungrounded water pump, because the
Army did not retain control over the manner in which the contractor installed the
pump.
350
Getz v. Boeing Co., 654 F.3d 852, 860–61 (9th Cir. 2011).
348
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Nevertheless, it is well settled that such a contractual relationship
with the government will not vest the private contractor with sovereign immunity.351
As explained in Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 352 in refusing
to extend sovereign immunity to a grenade manufacturer for a Vietnam training accident,
The doctrine of sovereign immunity may not be extended to cover the fault of a private corporation, no
matter how intimate its connection with the government. 353
. . . Therefore, the government does not become the
conduit of its immunity in suits against its agents and
instrumentalities merely because they do its work.354
This principle was reiterated more recently in the context of the
recent wars in McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc. 355
A private contractor that operates with “private profit
objectives in operating under [a] contract” is “an entity distinct from the government,” though the two
are contractually linked . . . .
. . . Defendants entered into the contract as a commercial endeavor. They provided a service for a
price. Simply because the service was provided in the
mountains of Afghanistan during armed conflict
does not render Defendants, or their personnel, members of the military or employees of the Government. 356
As such, Boyle expressly recognized that private military contractors were not entitled to sovereign immunity and accordingly,
Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, 502 F.2d 867, 874 (8th Cir. 1974).
Id.
353
Id. at 874 (and cases cited therein).
354
Id. at 874 n. 6 (and cases cited therein).
355
McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1326 (M.D.
Fla. 2006) aff’d 502 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2007) (and cases cited therein).
356
Id. at 1326–27.
351
352
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did not utilize the exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity
applicable to the government set forth in the FTCA to create analogous defenses for private contractors. 357 Instead, it looked to the discretionary function exception of the Act (28 U.S.C. §2680(a)) solely
for the purpose of determining whether the FTCA preempted state
tort claims arising out of the government’s exercise of its discretion
in one discrete specific area, the selection of specifications for military weapons. 358 As a result, Boyle clearly does not support the attempt to utilize the FTCA to create a system of parallel sovereign
immunity-like defenses for private contractors. 359
The broad scope of the combatant activities exception also
clearly exceeds the limited nature of the government contractor defense recognized by the Supreme Court in Boyle. As pointed out by
the court in Saleh, Boyle requires that for the government contractor
defense to apply,
one must discover a discrete discretionary governmental decision, which precludes suits based on that
decision, [the combatant activities exception] is more
like a field preemption . . . because it casts an immunity net over any claim that arises out of combatant activities. 360
Accordingly, the reasoning expressed in cases like Koohi,
Bentzlin, and Flanigan is clearly at odds with the underlying rationale of Boyle. As a result, the district court in McMahon, rejected
the analytical framework underlying this hybrid defense by observing,
Whether the Bentzlin and Koohi courts unwittingly
confused the government contractor defense and the
combatant activities exception to the FTCA, or
whether they crafted an entirely new defense based
on sovereign immunity and federal preemption, this
Court declines to endorse such a defense for private
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 502, 510–13 (1988).
Id. at 511–12.
359
Id. at 510.
360
Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (and cases cited
therein).
357
358
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contractors based solely on the fact that Defendants
were operating in a combat zone. This Court can find
no persuasive authority for the conclusion that the
combatant exception preempts state tort law claims.
The combatant activities exception to the FTCA is an
explicit legislative preservation of sovereign immunity, while the government contractor defense is a judicially recognized affirmative defense grounded in
federal preemption and the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The latter defense shields contractors only in military equipment procurement contracts and only when the government dictates design
specifications. Private contractors are not entitled to
sovereign immunity unless they are characterized as
government employees, which Defendants are
not. 361
The court therefore went on to hold,
There is no express authority for judicially intermixing the government contractor defense and the combatant activities exception; nor is there authority for
bestowing a private actor with the shield of sovereign
immunity . . . . Unless they qualify as employees or
agents of the Government, private contractors may
not bootstrap the Government’s sovereign immunity. 362
D.
The State Secrets Doctrine
Like many other issues involving military contractors, the state
secrets doctrine has resulted in differing opinions regarding both its
scope and application. Some cases have treated it as an evidentiary
privilege affecting only the admissibility of so-called state secrets,
allowing the case to go forward minus the privileged evidence. 363
Other cases, however, have given it a pre-emptive effect requiring
McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1330 (M.D.
Fla. 2006) aff’d 502 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2007) (and cases cited therein).
362
Id. (emphasis added).
363
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077–80 (9th Cir.
2010).
361
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the dismissal of the entire litigation, even where the parties can still
establish their claims and defenses through nonprivileged and sometimes even public evidence. 364
The state secrets doctrine has its origins in a suit brought by the
estate of a southern Civil War spy, which sued the federal government for breaching a secret agreement made with President Lincoln
to compensate the spy for his war time espionage services. 365 In Totten v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld Lincoln’s authority
“to employ secret agents” to spy on behalf of the government, 366
however, it affirmed the dismissal of the lawsuit. The Court reasoned that the nature of the underlying agreement was part of a class
of “secret employments.” 367 As a result, the Court went on to hold:
It may be stated as a general principle, that public
policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court
of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to
the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards
as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow
the confidence to be violated . . . . Much greater reason exists for the application of the principle to cases
of contract for secret services with the government,
as the existence of a contract of that kind is itself a
fact not to be disclosed. 368
Seventy-seven years later, the Supreme Court referenced Totten
in a footnote, but did not otherwise appear to rely upon it, in United
States v. Reynolds. 369 In Reynolds, the families of three civilian contractors who died in the crash of an Air Force plane on a highly secret mission sought the discovery of highly classified investigative
reports as part of their suit for recovery against the government under the FTCA. 370 The case arrived at the Court following the Third
364

Id.
Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 105–06 (1876).
366
Id. at 106.
367
Id. (“[S]ecret employments of the government in time of war, or upon matters affecting our foreign relations, where a disclosure of the service might compromise or embarrass our government in its public duties, or endanger the person
or injure the character of the agent.”).
368
Id. at 107.
369
345 U.S. 1, n.11 (1953).
370
Id. at 1.
365
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Circuit Court of Appeals affirmance of a default judgement entered
against the government as a sanction for refusing to produce the documents after the district court overruled the Air Force’s objection
based upon privilege. 371
In reversing the lower courts’ orders requiring the production of
the reports, the Court formally recognized the existence of an evidentiary privilege for military and state secrets, which allows the
U.S. government to block discovery in a lawsuit of any information
that, if disclosed, would adversely affect national security. 372 The
Court subsequently explained in General Dynamics Corp. v. U.S.,
that its holding in “Reynolds was about the admission of evidence.” 373 “It decided a purely evidentiary dispute by applying evidentiary rules.” 374 The Court described that in Reynolds “the privileged information [was] excluded and the trial [went] on without
it.” 375
At the same time, General Dynamics breathed new life into the
Court’s earlier Totten decision, treating it as a corollary of the state
secrets doctrine under which it was appropriate to dismiss entire actions under some circumstances. 376 General Dynamics involved a
lawsuit by the manufacturer of a stealth aircraft over the consequences of the cancellation of its multi-billion dollar contract with
The claim of privilege was based upon an Air Force regulation exempting
such reports from public disclosure that was enacted under the authority of 5
U.S.C. § 5 (now 5 U.S.C.§ 22). United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 1 (1953).
In Touhy v. Ragen, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of executive agencies
to enact such regulations. 340 U.S. 462, 469–470 (1951). Initially, the government
did not raise the claim in the district court that the documents constituted state
secrets. See sub nom. Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468, 472–73 (E.D. Pa.
1950) (“the Government does not here contend that this is a case involving the
well-recognized common law privilege protecting state secrets or facts which
might seriously harm the Government in its diplomatic relations, military operations or measures for national security”). Subsequent to the district court’s initial
ruling sustaining the plaintiffs’ motion to compel, however, the Judge Advocate
General of the Air Force filed an affidavit stating that the production would “seriously hamper[] national security . . . and the development of . . . secret military
equipment.” Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 990 (3d Cir. 1951).
372
Reynolds, 192 F.2d 987 at 996.
373
563 U.S. 478, 485 (2011) (emphasis added).
374
Id.
375
Id. (emphasis added).
376
Id. at 486–87.
371
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the Air Force. 377 In support of its claim that the military had misled
it at the bidding stage, the contractor relied upon the principle recognized in such cases that the Air Force had withheld “‘superior
knowledge’ of difficult-to-discover information ‘vital’ to contractual performance.” 378
To establish such “superior knowledge,” it was necessary to inquire into the Air Force’s prior experiences with stealth technology
in other projects. 379 Although disclosing some information regarding these earlier applications, the Air Force refused to provide all of
the information requested on the grounds that it constituted a privileged military secret. 380
In dismissing the lawsuit, despite the existence of sufficient nonprivileged evidence to make a prima facie showing of the application of the government’s superior knowledge of the technical problems facing the building of the subject stealth aircraft, the Court distinguished Reynolds and returned to Totten, 381
[the lower court’s] perception that in the present context the state-secrets issue raises something quite different from a mere evidentiary point seems to us
sound. What we are called upon to exercise is not our
power to determine the procedural rules of evidence,
but our common-law authority to fashion contractual
remedies in Government-contracting disputes. And
our state-secrets jurisprudence bearing upon that authority is not Reynolds, but two cases dealing with
alleged contracts to spy. 382
The “two cases” 383 relied upon by the Court were Totten and its
modern-day counterpart Tenet v. Doe, which involved the CIA’s
claimed breach of a contract with a spy during the Cold War. 384 In
Tenet, the Court reversed the lower courts’ refusal to dismiss the
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384

Id. at 481.
Id.
Id. at 481–82.
Id. at 482.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 485–86 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 486.
Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 1 (2005).
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lawsuit and expressly rejected the argument that Reynolds had “recast [Totten] simply as an early expression of the evidentiary ‘state
secrets’ privilege, rather than a categorical bar to [plaintiffs’]
claims.” 385 Although the Court’s language in Tenet focused on the
need to keep spy contracts secret, General Dynamics clearly expanded the applicability of the complete bar in some state secrets
cases beyond just espionage lawsuits. 386
Unfortunately, General Dynamics did not address the question
of when the state secrets doctrine crosses the line from an evidentiary privilege to a complete bar, kicking that can down the road by
observing,
what we promulgate today is not a statute but a common-law opinion, which, after the fashion of the
common law, is subject to further refinement where
relevant factors significantly different from those before us here counsel a different outcome. 387
In subsequently wrestling with the issue of where to draw this
line, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals surveyed the prior circuit
court decisions in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 388 which
involved a suit against military contractors by Iraqi nationals who
had been taken to black sites for the purposes of the CIA’s “so-called
‘extraordinary rendition program.’” 389
Ordinarily, simply excluding or otherwise walling
off the privileged information may suffice to protect
the state secrets and “the case will proceed accordingly, with no consequences save those resulting
from the loss of evidence.”

Id. at 8.
General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 563 U.S. 478, 486 (2011).
387
Id. at 491.
388
614 F.3d 1070, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted); see
also In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 152–54 (D.C. Cir. 2007); El-Masri v. United
States, 479 F.3d 296, 299–300 (4th Cir. 2007); Bareford v. General Dynamics
Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1140 (5th Cir. 1992); Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics
Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 545 (2d Cir. 1991).
389
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1073, 1075 (9th Cir.
2010).
385
386
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In some instances, however, application of the privilege may require dismissal of the action. When this
point is reached, the Reynolds privilege converges
with the Totten bar, because both require dismissal.
There are three circumstances when the Reynolds
privilege would justify terminating a case.
First, if “the plaintiff cannot prove the prima facie
elements of her claim with nonprivileged evidence,
then the court may dismiss her claim as it would with
any plaintiff who cannot prove her case.” Second,
“‘if the privilege deprives the defendant of information that would otherwise give the defendant a
valid defense to the claim, then the court may grant
summary judgment to the defendant.’”
Third, and relevant here, even if the claims and defenses might theoretically be established without relying on privileged evidence, it may be impossible to
proceed with the litigation because—privileged evidence being inseparable from nonprivileged information that will be necessary to the claims or defenses—litigating the case to a judgment on the merits would present an unacceptable risk of disclosing
state secrets. 390
Although more typically applied where the plaintiff is the party
seeking so-claimed secret information, as noted in the above quotation from Mohamed, the privilege may also come into play where
the information inures to the benefit of the defendant. 391 In such
cases, it has been held that a dismissal (or defense summary judgment) is appropriate where the exclusion of the evidence “so hampers the defendant in establishing a valid defense that the trier is
likely to reach an erroneous conclusion,” 392 or where it deprives the

390
391
392

Id. at 1082–83.
In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 148 (D. C. Cir. 2007).
Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d at 547.
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defendant of information that would otherwise give it a valid defense to the claim. 393
Where, however, the withholding of the privileged information
will not foreclose the possibility of a fair trial, the case will be allowed to proceed, but without the requested information. 394 In such
cases, individual claims or defenses may be stricken if dependent
upon the privileged information. 395
The privilege has been held to apply in a variety of different contexts, including to block production of “information that would result in ‘impairment of the nation’s defense capabilities, disclosure
of intelligence-gathering methods or capabilities, and disruption of
diplomatic relations with foreign governments,’ or where disclosure
‘would be inimical to national security . . . .’” 396 It is not necessary
for the United States or its agencies to be a party to the litigation,
however, only the government may assert the claim. 397
For the privilege to apply in the military context, the court need
only be satisfied that “there is a reasonable danger that compulsion
of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of
national security, should not be divulged.” 398 Where the privilege is
properly invoked, “even the most compelling necessity cannot
In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 148–49. See also General Dynamics Corp.,
563 U.S. at 486–87; White v. Raytheon Co., No. 07–10222–RGS, 2008 WL
5273290, at *1, *4 (D. Mass. Dec. 17, 2008) (suit by wife of Navy pilot shot down
in friendly fire incident while on patrol in Iraq by defective Patriot missile dismissed where the application of the state secrets doctrine deprived the manufacturer of necessary information to establish its claimed defenses); Bareford v. General Dynamic Co., 973 F.2d 1138, 1141–43 (5th Cir. 1992).
394
DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 2001)
(noting that where quashing defendant’s subpoena on the U.S. for documents protected by the state secrets doctrine did not foreclose possibility of fair trial, the
case would not be dismissed); In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 141, 154 (holding
Bivens action filed by DEA employee against State Department for Fourth
Amendment violations would be allowed to proceed because of the existence of
alternate sources of evidence).
395
See S.E.C. v. Naccio, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168–69 (D. Colo. 2009)
(“[W]here a defendant will be deprived of the privilege, the court may dismiss the
affected claims against that defendant.”).
396
Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir. 1995) (internal citation
omitted).
397
Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1991).
398
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
393
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overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied
that military secrets are at stake.” 399
Because of its breadth and severe effect, it has been repeatedly
recognized that the privilege may not be lightly applied. 400 “[W]henever possible, sensitive information must be disentangled from nonsensitive information to allow for the release of the latter.” 401
An important procedural safeguard imposed upon its application
is the requirement that only the head of the relevant government
agency may assert the formal claim and only after a personal review
of the matter. 402 Other subordinate officials may, however, file declarations in support of the objection once it is asserted by the department head. 403
Although the judiciary is charged with making the final determination of whether the privilege applies, the Supreme Court has
admonished that courts must be careful to avoid “forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.” 404 In assessing the risk of disclosure, courts traditionally show the utmost
deference to executive assertions of privilege or presidential responsibilities upon grounds of military or diplomatic secret. 405 Furthermore, judicial review of such a claim of privilege is necessarily narrow. 406
While observing that “[j]udicial control over the evidence cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers,” the Court in
Reynolds went on to caution “we will not go so far as to say that the
court may automatically require a complete disclosure to the judge
before the claim will be accepted in any case.” 407 To strike this balance from a practical standpoint, the Supreme Court has stated that
courts should first attempt to determine whether the application of
Id. at 11.
Id. at 7. See also General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 563 U.S. 478,
492 (2011) (“[the privilege] is the option of last resort, available in a very narrow
set of circumstances.”).
401
Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
402
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7–8; Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th
Cir. 1995).
403
Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1169–70 (9th Cir. 1998).
404
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8.
405
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710, 713 (1974).
406
Id.
407
Reynolds, 345 U.S at 9–10.
399
400
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the privilege can be established by extrinsic evidence, in which case
an in camera inspection of the privileged information is not appropriate. 408 As explained by the Court, “When . . . the occasion for the
privilege is appropriate, . . . the court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an
examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers.” 409
The privilege has been typically held to apply in cases involving
claims of defective military armaments, such as claimed failures in
friendly aircraft identification systems, 410 missile targeting equipment, 411or missile defense systems. 412 As with other products liability cases involving non-military products, cases of this nature require the production of design and manufacturing specifications,
product performance standards, quality control processes, training
materials, records of prior system failures, and internal analysis of
product capabilities and vulnerabilities. 413 In the military context,
these materials almost always contain classified information. 414
Claims of military equipment failures raise their own unique issues as well. While most product liability claims raise causation issues revolving around the question of whether the product was used
properly, in the military context this issue often requires an analysis
of whether the operators properly followed Rules of Engagement
and/or their training procedures, which are normally classified. 415

408
Id. at 10. See also El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 306 (4th Cir.
2007); Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 548 (rejecting request for in camera inspection in suit for deaths of Navy sailors alleging that defects in missile defense system failed to repel Iraq air attack).
409
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
410
Mounsey v. Allied-Signal, Inc., No. CV 95-4309 SVW (MCx), 2000 WL
34017116, at *1 (C.D. Cal. April 10, 2000); White v. Raytheon Co., No. 07–
10222–RGS, 2008 WL 5273290, at *1, *5 (D. Mass. Dec. 17, 2008).
411
Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp 1486, 1487 (C. D. Cal. 1993).
412
Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d at 544, 546 (analyzing the purported failure of the
Phalanx Anti-Missile System); Bareford v. General Dynamic Co., 973 F.2d 1138,
1140 (5th Cir. 1992) (analyzing the claimed flaws of the Phalanx military weapon
system).
413
See, e.g., Bentzlin, 833 F. Supp. at 1496–97.
414
Id.
415
See, e.g., Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d at 547; Mounsey, 2000 WL 34017116 at
*2, *8.
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Another area where the privilege has come into play has been in
suits arising out of claimed torture during alleged illegal renditions
by the CIA and military contractors. 416 In El-Masri v. U.S., 417 the
court dismissed the suit of a German national, who had been arrested
by Macedonian authorities and subsequently transferred to a CIA
black site in Afghanistan, despite the plaintiff’s claim that the CIA’s
rendition program was widely known and extensively reported in
the media. 418 The court concluded that even though the general subject matter of such renditions was known, the specific facts necessary to prove the plaintiff’s case were not. 419
To establish a prima facie case, he would be obliged
to produce admissible evidence not only that he was
detained and interrogated, but that the [specific] defendants were involved in his detention and interrogation in a manner that renders them personally liable to him. Such a showing could be made only with
evidence that exposes how the CIA organizes, staffs,
and supervises its most sensitive intelligence operations. 420
Although there is a legitimate need for a government secrets
privilege, in the absence of strict and well-defined rules for its application, there is potential for abuse, including the denial of compensation to the families of military personnel who die needlessly as
a result of the negligence of government contractors. Bareford v.
General Dynamic Co. 421 presents a good example of such potential.
In this case, the families of thirty-seven Navy sailors, who were
killed by a missile strike on the U.S.S. Stark during the Iran-Iraq
War, brought suit against the manufacturers of the ship’s Phalanx
defense system contending that its defects led to the success of the
attack. 422

416
417
418
419
420
421
422

El Maris, v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300–01 (4th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 302.
Id. at 300–02.
Id. at 308–09.
Id. at 309.
Bareford v. General Dynamic Co., 973 F.2d 1138, 1142 (5th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1138, 1140.
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The plaintiffs produced over 2,500 pages of unclassified documents in support of their claims, including eleven Congressional reports, which the court acknowledged provided “substantial evidence
from which a judge or jury might find problems, or even wrongdoing, by General Dynamics in its production and testing of the Phalanx system.” 423 Although the Department of Navy did not challenge
any of these documents, the court accepted its contention that dismissal was still required:
[t]he government maintains that, even if the data is
available from non-secret sources, acknowledgment
of this information by government officers would
still be damaging to the government, because the
acknowledgement would lend credibility to the unofficial data. These cases stand for the proposition that
disclosure of information by government officials
can be prejudicial to government interests, even if the
information has already been divulged from nongovernment sources. 424
E.
Arbitration
Over recent years there has been a tendency among industries,
especially those which either employ foreign workers or hire U.S.
citizens for jobs overseas, to incorporate arbitration provisions into
their contracts. 425 Due to this trend, the courts have been called upon
to decide an increasing number of cases involving the application of
such clauses in the context of injuries to employees of military contractors. 426
The Federal Arbitration Act provides that arbitration provisions
in employment contracts “involving commerce” are enforceable, except “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 427 The courts have given the enabling
Id. at 1142.
Id. at 1144 (internal citations omitted).
425
See, e.g., Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2005)
(upholding arbitration provision in foreign seaman’s contract with Miami cruise
line).
426
See id.
427
9 U.S.C. § 1.
423
424
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“involving commerce” clause a broad application consistent with
the reach of Congress’ power over interstate commerce. 428 The exception limits the grounds upon which arbitration agreements may
be invalidated to those “‘generally applicable contract defenses,
such as fraud, duress or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that
apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact
that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.” 429
Although Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act on its face
exempts “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” 430 the Supreme Court has construed this provision to limit
its application to such workers only while engaged in transportation
employment activities. 431 As a result, arbitration clauses in military
contractor employment contracts are permissible, except in those
circumstances where contracts in general would be voidable. 432
Typically, a two-step approach has been used by the courts in
analyzing whether a particular controversy is subject to arbitration. 433 The first step requires a determination of whether the parties
have agreed to arbitrate the specific dispute. 434 This question in turn
has two sub-parts: “(1) is there a valid agreement to arbitrate the
claims and (2) does the dispute in question fall within the scope of
that arbitration agreement.” 435 Where the answer to both of these
questions is in the affirmative, the second step looks to whether there
is any federal statute or public policy which would be violated by
requiring arbitration of the particular claim. 436

See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1984); Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 (1967).
429
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conception, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).
430
9 U.S.C. § 1.
431
Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001). More recently, in
New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, the Court held that the exclusion would apply regardless of whether the worker was an employee or independent contractor. 139 S.Ct.
532, 543 (2019).
432
See generally Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 234–35 (5th Cir.
2009).
433
Id.
434
Id. at 233–34.
435
Id. at 234.
436
Id.
428
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Federal courts favor arbitration as a matter of public policy, generally holding that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitration
should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” 437 As a result, some
courts have gone so far as to conclude “a valid agreement to arbitrate
applies ‘unless it can be said with positive assurance that [the] arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation which would
cover the dispute at issue.’” 438
Nevertheless, it has also generally been recognized that parties
cannot be required to arbitrate controversies which they have not
agreed to arbitrate and accordingly, “[e]ven though there is that presumption in favor of arbitration, ‘[t]he courts are not to twist the
language of the contract to achieve a result which is favored by federal policy but contrary to the intent of the parties.’” 439As a result,
the question of whether claims brought by the employees of military
contractors against their employers are subject to arbitration is dependent upon the specific language of their employment contracts.
In cases involving straightforward personal injury and wrongful
death claims, the courts have generally upheld the enforceability of
clauses containing the typical arbitration language. 440 For example,
in Nordan, which arose out of the grisly 2004 murders of four security contractors in Fallujah, the district court granted Blackwater’s
petition to compel arbitration where the families had sued the contractor for negligence, reckless misconduct, and fraud in failing to
properly train, arm, equip, support, and otherwise prepare their decedents for the mission to which they had been assigned. 441 Similar
results have been reached in other tort cases. 442
Id. at 235.
Id. (quoting Personal Sec. & Safety Sys., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 297 F.3d
388, 392 (5th Cir. 2002)).
439
Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1214 (11th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Goldberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 912 F.2d 1418, 1419-20 (11th Cir.
1990)).
440
Blackwater Security Consulting, LLC. v. Nordan, 2011 WL 237840 at *11
(E.D.N.C. Jan. 21, 2011).
441
Nordan, 2011 WL 237840 at *2. The contract required the arbitration of
“any dispute regarding the interpretation or enforcement of any of the parties’
rights or obligations under this Agreement.” See Nordan v. Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 801, 806 (E.D.N.C. 2005).
442
See, e.g., Coffey v. Kellogg Brown & Root, 2009 WL 2515649, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 13, 2009) (noting the employment contract required arbitration of “any
and all claims that employee might have against the company . . . either (i) related
437
438
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Where other types of claims have been involved, judicial treatment has been mixed. For example, in Jones v. Halliburton Co.,
which involved the alleged gang rape of an employee by other coemployees while stationed in Baghdad, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that some of the plaintiff’s claims were subject to arbitration, while
others were not. 443
Following her arrival in Baghdad, the 20-year-old plaintiff was
assigned to a predominately male barracks in the Green Zone and
immediately began to complain about sexual harassment, claiming
she was told by management to “go to the spa.” 444 Several days later,
Jones claimed that she was drugged and brutally raped by a number
of Halliburton firefighters, while off duty after a social function in
her barracks. 445
After what the plaintiff described as further harassment and mishandling of her resulting complaints by management, she filed a
claim with the EEOC, which “credited [her] claim of sexual harassment [and found] cause to believe that the Halliburton defendants
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” 446 In addition,
she also successfully asserted a claim for compensation benefits under the DBA. 447
Subsequently, Jones filed a multi-count complaint against Halliburton in the federal district court in Texas, seeking recovery under
ten different theories: “negligence; negligent undertaking; sexual
harassment and hostile work environment under Title VII; retaliation; false imprisonment; breach of contract; fraud in the inducement to enter the employment contract; fraud in the inducement to
enter the arbitration agreement; assault and battery and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.” 448
Halliburton moved to dismiss the suit and compel arbitration under a clause in the plaintiff’s contract, which required the arbitration
of “any and all claims that you might have against Employer related
to their employment, including termination of employment, or (2) for personal
injuries arising in the workplace . . .”).
443
Jones, 583 F.3d at 231–32, 242.
444
Jones v. Halliburton Company, 625 F. Supp. 2d 339, 343 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
445
Id.
446
Id.
447
Jones, 583 F.3d 228, 243.
448
Jones, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 344.
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to your employment, including your termination, and any and all
personal injury claims arising in the workplace . . . .” 449
While upholding the validity of the arbitration agreement, the
district court concluded that the specific claims based upon assault
and battery; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent
hiring, supervision, and retention; and false imprisonment did not
arise out of Jones’ “scope of employment,” and were therefore not
subject to arbitration. 450 In reaching this conclusion the court observed, “[a]lthough the arbitration provision extends to personal injury claims arising in the workplace, the Court does not believe that
Plaintiff’s bedroom should be considered the workplace, even
though her housing was provided by her employer.” 451
The court also rejected the argument that the plaintiff’s prior application for and receipt of benefits under the DBA estopped her
from contending that these claims were outside the scope of her employment, since “[t]he Court does not believe that the liberal interpretation of the term ‘scope of employment’ in the workers compensation context can be incorporated wholesale into the interpretation
of an arbitration provision.” 452
Although rejecting the lower court’s conclusion that the scope
of the arbitration clause was to be determined by state, rather than
federal law, the Fifth Circuit otherwise subsequently affirmed the
district court’s rationale as well as its ultimate findings and holdings. 453 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit likewise rejected the conclusion of another Texas district court in Barker v. Halliburton,454
which had held that claims arising out of a sexual assault against
another female employee of the same contractor in her quarters were
subject to arbitration, since the perpetrator had allegedly violated the
employer’s rules during the course of the attack. 455 The Fifth Circuit
Id. at 343–44.
Id. at 354–55.
451
Id. at 353. See also Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1209
1217–18 (11th Cir. 2011), which involved a purported rape of a crewmember
aboard a cruise ship that relied heavily upon Jones to reach a similar result under
a broader arbitration provision.
452
Jones, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 354.
453
Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 242 (5th Cir. 2009).
454
541 F. Supp. 2d 879 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
455
Id. at 887, 889–90; Jones, 583 F.3d at 237–38.
449
450
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concluded that such allegations were not enough to bring such an
attack within the scope of the plaintiff’s employment. 456
Outside of the sexual assault context, however, arbitration provisions have generally been upheld even in non-personal injury
claims. 457 For example, in McBride v. Halliburton Co., 458 an employee claimed that its employer had committed various fraudulent
acts against the government under its LOCGAP contract for which
the plaintiff was entitled to seek damages on behalf of the United
States under the False Claims Act. 459 The plaintiff further alleged
that she was terminated in retaliation for acting as a whistleblower
and thereafter subsequently falsely imprisoned. 460
The court concluded that all the claims were subject to arbitration under the terms of the plaintiff’s contract which provided for
arbitration of “any matters with respect to” her employment, including her termination and “any other matter related to or concerning
the relationship between the Employee and the Company.” 461
One of the issues arising from the application of arbitration
clauses is the impact of the inability of a plaintiff to be able to afford
payment for the costs of such arbitration, which can be extremely
high. 462 The American Arbitration Association’s International Dispute Resolution Division, which generally hears such claims,
charges a sliding scale filing fee. 463 For matters in which the plaintiff
claims damages in the $1 million to $10 million range, the filing fee
alone is presently $18,975. 464 More significantly, however, are the
fees of the arbitrators, who are typically experienced attorneys
Jones, 583 F.3d at 237–38.
See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., No. 05-00828(HHK).,
2007 WL 1954441, at *1 (D.D.C. July 5, 2007).
458
Id.
459
Id. 31 U.S.C. §3729 et seq. permits a private individual to bring a claim on
behalf of themselves and the government. The complaint is initially filed under
seal and if the government decides, after investigating the claim, that it does not
wish to pursue it, the private party then may proceed forward with the litigation.
460
U.S. ex rel. McBride, 2007 WL 1954441, at *1.
461
Id. at *5.
462
International Arbitration Fee Schedule, INT’L CTR. DISP. RESOL. 1 (Oct. 1,
2017), go.sdr.org/internationalfeeschedule.
463
Id.
464
Id. The fee is paid in two installments, $8,625 initially and $10,350 prior
to the first hearing. Id.
456
457
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charging anywhere from $400 to $1000 per hour. 465 Since some arbitration agreements call for a panel of three arbitrators, the hourly
fees can become tripled. 466
In the commercial context, corporations can make their own
analysis as to the affordability of such fees as part of their contract
negotiations and decide whether to enter into such agreements. The
normal employee of a military contractor, however, generally has
no such bargaining power. Typically, the injured employee or his
family, in the case of a wrongful death claim, rarely is able to bear
such costs, especially after the loss of the family’s major breadwinner. 467
Several courts have held out the possibility that arbitration can
be challenged where its costs would be prohibitively expensive for
the plaintiff to be able to obtain redress for its statutory remedies. 468
To avoid this problem, some employers have agreed to pay for the
costs of arbitration as part of their employment contract. 469 However, even where the contract calls for the splitting of the arbitration
costs, the threshold for proving such a defense has rendered it nearly
illusory as evidenced by a series of Eleventh Circuit cases dealing
with the analogous arbitration of seamen’s contracts. 470
This defense has not fared any better in military contractor cases.
In the long running Nordan case, the district court granted Blackwater’s petition to compel arbitration in 2007. 471 The employment contract required that the arbitration be conducted before the American
465
See Deborah Rothman, Trends in Arbitrator Compensation, DISP. RESOL.
MAG. 1, 1 (2017) available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publications/dispute_resolution_magazine/spring2017/3_rothman_trends_in_arbitrator.authcheckdam.pdf.
466
International Arbitration Fee Schedule, supra note 462, at 2.
467
See, e.g., Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC v. Nordan, No. 2:06-CV-49-F,
2011 WL237840, at *2, *3 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 21, 2011).
468
See Anders v. Hometown Mortg. Servs., 346 F.3d 1024, 1029 (11th Cir.
2003); Escobar v. Celebration Cruise Operator, Inc., 805 F.3d 1279, 1291–92
(11th Cir. 2015); Suazo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 822 F.3d 543, 545 (11th Cir.
2016).
469
See, e.g., Anders, 346 F.3d at 1029.
470
See Escobar, 805 F.3d at 1283 (holding that a seaman, who filed an affidavit indicating that he was unemployed and had $0 in the bank, and thus could
not pay half of the anticipated arbitration fees of $20,000, failed to meet his burden to establish this defense); Suazo, 822 F.3d at 545.
471
Blackwater Sec. Consulting, 2011 WL 237840, at *2.
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Arbitration Association (“AAA”), which as noted above has rather
substantial fees for both filing in the first instance and the ongoing
payment of its arbitrators. 472
The attorney for the deceased contractors’ families initially filed
a hardship request with the AAA requesting that it waive its filing
fee on the grounds that his clients could not afford to pay it. 473 The
AAA instead offered to defer payment of the filing fee until the end
of the case, to which the families agreed. 474 Subsequently, the AAA
issued bills for the payment of its arbitrators’ fees. 475 Following the
indication by the families’ counsel that they could not afford these
fees, Blackwater initially paid them, however, later refused to pay
subsequent fee requests over the next few years. 476 As a result, the
AAA refused to go forward with the arbitration, eventually dismissing the claims and bringing the case to a premature conclusion. 477
III.

CRIMINAL LIABILITY

A.
Under Iraqi Law
On May 16, 2003, Coalition Administrator Paul Bremer adopted
the original Coalition Provisional Authority (“CPA”) Regulations. 478 Regulation number 1 vested the powers of government for
the administration of Iraq in the CPA as well as “all executive,

The initial filing fee at the time was $13,500. See id. at *2, *6.
Id. at *3.
474
Id.
475
Id.
476
Id.
477
Id.
478
The CPA’ s authority derived from the status of the United States and Great
Britain as occupying powers as acknowledged in UN Security Council Resolution
1483, adopted on May 22, 2003. See JAMES DOBBINS ET AL., OCCUPYING IRAQ:
A HISTORY OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY 12 (2009), available at
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_ MG84
7.pdf. The CPA governed Iraq from May 2003 to June 28, 2004. The CPA Administrator, Paul Bremer, was appointed by President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfield. See U.S. ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC., 562 F.3d
295, 298 (4th Cir. 2009).
472
473
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legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives . . . .” 479
Pursuant to this grant of authority, Administrator Bremer subsequently adopted revised CPA Order Number 17, which provided
that all contractors and their employees working under contract with
the CPA “shall be immune from Iraqi legal process.” 480 Under this
order, such contractors and their employees would, however, still be
subject to jurisdiction of the country which sent them. 481
As a result, neither military contractors or their employees may
be legally held liable for violation of Iraq’s criminal laws, nor tried
in an Iraqi court. 482
B.
Under U.S. Law
Although CPA Order Number 17 immunizes contractors and
their employees from the reach of Iraqi law, it still subjects them to
the jurisdiction of the country which sent them. 483 Therefore, to the
extent that the home county has criminal jurisdiction for acts occurring in either Iraq or Afghanistan, contractors and their employees
may still be subject to criminal process under such laws. 484
In earlier wars, civilians that accompanied American forces
overseas had been subject to military court-martial for crimes committed in their host countries. 485 This practice was codified by the
adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950, which
provided for the jurisdiction of military courts over:
(10) In time of declared war or a contingency operation, persons serving with or accompanying an
armed force in the field.
COAL. PROVISIONAL AUTH., DEP’T OF DEF., CPA/REG/16 MAY2003/01,
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (2003).
480
COAL. PROVISIONAL AUTH., DEP’T OF DEF., CPA/ORD/27 JUNE2004/17,
STATUS OF CPA, MNFI, CERTAIN MISSIONS AND PERSONNEL IN IRAQ W/AMEX
**REVISED** (2004).
481
Id. at Section 3(1).
482
See id.
483
Id.
484
Id. at Section 2(4).
485
See, e.g., In re Varney’s Petition, 141 F. Supp. 190, 200–01 (S.D. Cal.
1956) (and cases cited therein); see also Hines v. Mikell, 259 F. 28, 35 (4th Cir.
1919).
479
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(11) . . . persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United
States . . . .
(12) . . . persons within an area leased by or otherwise reserved or acquired for the use of the United
States which is under the control of the Secretary
concerned and which is outside the United
States . . . . 486
In 1957, however, the Supreme Court held in Reid v. Covert that
military court-martial for capital cases stemming from crimes occurring outside of the United States in times of peace, improperly
deprived civilian dependents of servicemen of their constitutionally
protected rights. 487 Three years later, in Kinsella v. Singleton, the
Court expanded its holding in Reid to include noncapital crimes
committed by civilian dependents 488 In two more cases that year, the
Court applied these holdings to civilian employees that were U.S.
citizens. 489
Following these decisions, many crimes committed thereafter
fell into a “jurisdictional vacuum” as a result of the then-existing
presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. criminal
statutes, and the reluctance of many host countries to prosecute
crimes that did not involve their own citizens. 490

10 U.S.C. § 802 (emphasis added). In 2007, subsection 10 was changed
from “[i]n time of war” to “[i]n time of declared war or a contingency operation”
in order to nullify the decision by the United States Court of Military Appeals in
United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 365 (C.M.A. 1970), which held that a
civilian employee of an Army contractor in Vietnam could not be court-martialed
because the conflict was not a declared war. See United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256,
262 (C.A.A.F. 2012).
487
354 U.S. 1, 4–5, 19 (1957). Reid involved two consolidated convictions
against the wives of service members stationed overseas during peacetime that
were found guilty of murdering their spouses.
488
Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 248 (1960).
489
See Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 280 (1960) (finding civilian employee of the Corps of Engineers guilty of capital crime reversed); see also
McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 284 (1960) (finding
civilian employees of Army and Air Force guilty of noncapital charges reversed).
490
U.S. v. Slatten, 865 F.3d 767, 779 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
486
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To address this “vacuum,” Congress adopted the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (“MEJA”), 491 which extended
federal criminal jurisdiction, just in time for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. 492 Initially, the MEJA only applied to extraterritorial
crimes committed by civilians 493 employed by the Department of
Defense or its contractors. 494 Following the Abu Ghraib torture
scandal, which involved contractors working for the Department of
the Interior, it was amended to reach contractors and their employees working for all agencies supporting the war effort, so long as
their actions at the time of the purported crime “relate[d] to supporting a DOD mission.” 495
Although there was originally some debate among commentators over whether the MEJA could extend the reach of United States
criminal law to cover actions by civilian contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, 496 the circuit courts that subsequently considered the issue have found such jurisdiction to exist. 497
One such highly publicized criminal case involved the September 16, 2007, shootout by Blackwater security personnel, which
18 U.S.C. § 3261.
18 U.S.C. § 3261.
493
The Act applies to servicemen who commit crimes while a member of the
Armed Forces but cease to be subject to military law at the time of being charged.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3261(d).
494
Slatten, 865 F.3d at 779.
495
Id. at 779–80 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3267).
496
See Anthony Giardino, Using Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Prosecute Violations of the Law of War: Looking Beyond the War Crimes Act, 48 B.C. L. REV.
699 (2007); Andrew Fallon & Theresa Keene, Closing the Legal Loophole? Practical Implications of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 51 A.F.
L. REV. 271 (2001); Wm. C. Peters, On Law, Wars, and Mercenaries: The Case
for Courts-Martial Jurisdiction Over Civilian Contractor Misconduct in Iraq,
2006 BYU L. REV. 367 (2006).
497
See Slatten, 865 F.3d at 767, 777 (D.C. Cir.) (upholding the convictions of
Blackwater security guards for charges arising from the killing and wounding of
31 Iraq civilians in Baghdad); United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 547, 552 (4th Cir.
2012) (upholding indictment against South African national employed by
DynaCorp for assault of British citizen at military airbase in Afghanistan); United
States v. Green, 654 F.3d 637, 653 (6th Cir. 2011) (upholding a conviction of former serviceman for crimes committed in Iraq prior to his discharge under MEJA);
see also United States v. Williams, 509 F. App’x 899, 902 (11th Cir. 2013) (upholding constitutionality of prosecution under MEJA for crimes committed by civilian spouse against his daughter while in Japan and Okinawa).
491
492
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resulted in the deaths of fourteen Iraqi civilians and the wounding
of twenty others, as discussed in the Introduction. 498 While providing security protection for a State Department official traveling from
a meeting site back to the Green Zone, four of the Blackwater personnel got into a firefight at a street intersection, claiming that they
were attacked first. 499 Two days after the incident, the security personnel provided written statements to the Department of State based
upon assurances that neither the statements, nor any information derived from the statements, would be used against them. 500 Following
various investigations by the State Department, Army, and FBI, federal prosecutors concluded that the shooting was an “unprovoked
illegal attack” 501 and a federal grand jury in Washington D.C. subsequently handed down indictments against the security personnel
for manslaughter. 502
The indictments were initially dismissed by the district court on
the grounds that the defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights had been
violated by the impact of the compelled statements. 503 The dismissals were subsequently reversed by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which concluded that the district court had failed to conduct
a proper independent source analysis to determine whether sufficient non-tainted evidence existed to prosecute the security personnel. 504
Following the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, 505 new
superseding indictments were handed down, and as a result, in an
United States v. Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d 112,116 (D.D.C. 2009).
Id. at 116.
500
Id. at 118–19.
501
Sari Horwitz, New Charges Brought Against Former Blackwater Guards
in Baghdad Shooting, WASH. POST: NAT’L SEC. (Oct. 17, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/new-charges-broughtagainst-former-blackwater-guards-in-baghdad-shooting/2013/10/17.
502
Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 115–16.
503
Id.
504
United States v. Slough, 641 F.3d 544, 551 (D.C. Cir. 2011). This opinion
only applied to four of the five guards originally charged as the government
moved to dismiss the indictment against Nicholas Slatten without prejudice to
seek a later re-indictment. Slatten was later reindicted and convicted of murder;
see also Matt Apuzzo, Blackwater Guards Found Guilty in 2007 Iraq Killings,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/us/blackwater-verdict.html.
505
United States v. Slough, 566 U.S. 1043 (2012).
498
499
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October 2014 trial, one of the guards was found guilty of first degree
murder and three others of manslaughter and weapons charges. 506
Slatten, the guard convicted of murder, was sentenced to life imprisonment and each of the others to 30 years in prison. 507 Although
Slatten’s original conviction was vacated for failure to sever his case
from the others, 508 he was subsequently convicted a second time. 509
The cases were finally closed over 12 years after they started, when
the four guards were pardoned in December of 2020 by President
Trump as part of his highly controversial deluge of pardons on his
way out of office. 510
Another potential avenue for exerting U.S. criminal jurisdiction
is found in the War Crimes Act, which applies to both members of
the Armed Forces and U.S. nationals. 511Under the Act, jurisdiction
exists to prosecute various “war crimes,” which are defined as
“grave breach[es]” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 512 as well as
violations of specific portions of the 1907 Hague Convention. 513
In 2006, Congress amended the Act to exclude “foreign or international” law as sources for determining prohibited conduct and
Matt Apuzzo, supra note 504.
Matt Apuzzo, Ex-Blackwater Guards Given Long Terms for Killing Iraqis,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/us/ex-blackwater-guards-sentenced-to-prison-in-2007-killings-of-iraqi-civilians.html. The
sentences for the three guards convicted of manslaughter were subsequently reduced to between 12 and 15 years. See Ashraf Khalil, Sentences Reduced for 3
Blackwater Guards from 2007 Iraq Massacre, MIL. TIMES: PENTAGON & CONG.
(Sept. 8, 2019), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/
09/08/sentences-reduced-for-3-blackwater-guards-from-2007-iraq-massacre/.
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then went on to identify specific acts that would form a basis for
jurisdiction. 514 The conduct identified by Congress under these conventions giving rise to jurisdiction consists of torture, murder, mutilation and maiming, intentionally causing serious bodily injury,
rape, sexual assault, taking hostages, and performing biological experiments. 515 The 2006 Amendment also gave the President “the authority for the United States to interpret the meaning and application
of the Geneva Conventions and to promulgate higher standards and
administrative regulations for violations of treaty obligations which
are not grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.” 516
Another basis for American courts to exercise jurisdiction for
extra-territorial crimes is the Anti-Torture Statute. 517 This statute
applies to acts of torture as defined in the Act, which are performed
outside of the United States by either citizens or foreign nationals
who are then arrested within this country.518 The Act does not provide a basis for private civil remedies, only criminal prosecution.519
CONCLUSION
Although the military has used civilian contractors in every major conflict from the Revolutionary War to the present, their role and
duties have evolved dramatically over the years. These changes have
been spurred by many factors, including advances in technology and
the resulting redirection of resources away from human warriors,
political decisions to reduce the military budget and standing army
strength following the end of the Cold War, the elimination of the
draft, and changes in the nature of war itself. Perhaps one of the most
514
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Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984). Al
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States, 456 F.3d 640, 644–45 (6th Cir. 2006); Brown v. Victor, 337 F. App’x 239,
241 (3d Cir. 2009).
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significant factors has been the underlying political philosophy of
privatization of government functions, which has characterized both
Republican and Democratic administrations over the past two decades. 520
As a result, civilian contractors now fulfill many functions that
were previously performed by military personnel, which has resulted in the deployment of their employees to more forward battlefield positions than ever before. 521 The exposure of private civilians
to greater risks of harm has also been enhanced by the increasing
use of contractors to provide security forces for everything from the
guarding of military bases to the protection of U.S. State Department
officials and even Iraqi cabinet members. 522
This redefinition of the civilians’ role in the U.S. military war
effort has raised many new legal issues for which there is often a
lack of established relevant precedent. As previously discussed,
much of the existing case law was developed during World War II
and the Vietnam conflict, in which civilians played dramatically
smaller and more isolated roles than in recent war efforts. 523
As a result, certain legal principles have developed in historical
contexts, which are sometimes hard to reconcile with today’s warfare environment. For example, the continued rationale for utilizing
the LHWCA to govern claims arising out of the wars in Afghanistan,
which is a landlocked mountainous country, and Iraq, a country with
vast deserts and a mere 36 miles of coastline, are hard to justify. 524
The use of the LHWCA to decide claims arising out of the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan is largely the result of a historical accident,
stemming from the development of the Defense Base Act in World
War II in response to the needs created by President Roosevelt’s
Lend-Lease Program with Great Britain. As such, the LHWCA provides a relatively modest schedule of benefits for injured workers,
comparable to those provided by state workers compensation
acts. 525
See Turner & Norton, supra note 3, at 1–2; SCAHILL, supra note 12, at 61:
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Although longshoring work is hardly easy, the risks and types of
injuries to which the typical longshoreman is exposed certainly do
not compare to the hazards of working in a wartime environment
with enemy troops and insurgents trying to kill or maim opposition
workers, not to mention the perils posed by friendly fire and weapon
systems’ malfunctions. 526 As noted by one military author, due to
the “asymmetric threat on [today’s] nonlinear battlefield, there is no
‘safe’ zone within the area of operation” 527 for contractors.
Even in the context of the relatively safer work environment, the
LHWCA also gives longshoremen a much broader ability to sue
non-employer third parties for negligently inflicted injuries than are
available to the employees of military contractors, who must contend with political question, government contractor, combatant activities exception and government secret defenses. 528
Due to the lack of established relevant common law predicate
coupled with the absence of any comprehensive Congressional treatment of these issues, the district courts have been left to struggle
with many new and complex questions raised by these changed civilian roles, relationships and functions without much of a framework for guidance. Consequently, many cases have reached diametrically opposite results that are often not logically capable of reconciliation. 529
Take for example the unfortunately too common convoy ambush, which has produced many of the claims arising out of these
recent conflicts. 530 A civilian employee in the convoy operated by
See generally In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2007); General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 563 U.S. 478; White v. Raytheon Co., No.
07–10222–RGS, 2008 WL 5273290, at *1 (D. Mass. Dec. 17, 2008) (dismissing
a suit by wife of Navy pilot shot down in a friendly fire incident while on patrol
in Iraq by a defective Patriot missile where application of state secrets doctrine
deprived the manufacturer of necessary information to establish its claimed defenses).
527
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Bar, 6th Ed. 2019).
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his employer is limited to the relatively modest schedule of benefits
provided by the LHWCA. 531 Another civilian employee of a different contractor riding in the same convoy can bring a claim for all
damages allowed under the tort laws of the state where the operating
contractor is headquartered. 532 Similarly, an army soldier injured in
the same convoy would also have the right to bring a state law claim
against the contractor. 533
That is, of course, assuming that the plaintiff is lucky enough to
avoid getting one of the judges, who have applied the political question doctrine, government contractor defense, or combatant activities exception to such claims. 534 Even after navigating these shoals
there is always the unpredictable application of the state secrets doctrine. 535
As a result, the answers to questions—such as the application of
the political question doctrine, the parameters of the government
contractor defense, the validity and scope of the combatant activities
exception, the extension of sovereign immunity to private entities
and the limitations imposed on the application of the state secrets
doctrine—often seem to rely too much on the luck of the draw in
getting a judge with the right political philosophy, rather than existing legal precedent.
If there was ever an area of overwhelmingly unique federal interest, it is the subject of military contractors’ legal liabilities and
responsibilities. As aptly described by one commentator,
Never has there been such a reliance on nonmilitary
members to accomplish tasks directly affecting the
tactical success of an engagement . . . the military is
facing a fundamental change in the way it conducts
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warfare, and there is little evidence that the players
have been adequately prepared for that change. 536
This is clearly an area that calls out for a comprehensive Congressional solution. The present patchwork quilt of remedies is neither adequate nor fair and is lacking the predictability that the law
should provide to its citizens, especially those who are called upon
to risk their lives for the defense of their country.
Accordingly, the only rational solution is for Congress to step in
and create a unified system of recovery, which is relevant to the
modern battlefield and the risks and dangers to which the employees
of today’s contractors are exposed. Whether it is to permit tort damage claims to go forward to be tried before either a judge or jury or
whether it is to create a realistic schedule of workers compensation
type benefits, a single comprehensive system covering all military
contractors and their employees working on the battlefield is necessary to provide both the predictability and fairness necessary under
the law.
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